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From their origins until the present date, class actions have rested
on the assumption that those within the class shared a commonality of
interest. When the class is sufficiently cohesive, the named represen-
tative may appropriately litigate the interests of the entire class.
American law generally holds that when a properly structured class
action is resolved by a judicial judgment, the entire class is bound.
This feature-the binding effect of a class judgment-has made the
class action a useful, if controversial, device for compacting within one
suit dozens or even hundreds of individual actions. There are, how-
ever, trade-offs. For example, most individuals within the class ("un-
named" or "absent" members) have little or no control over the
manner in which the class action is conducted. They thus may find
themselves subject to a judgment in a suit in which their personal
voices were limited or unheard.
Since the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
("Rule 23"), there has been relentless academic debate and increasing
judicial disagreement over the res judicata effects of class action judg-
ments. In particular, arguments have centered around the question of
binding absentee class members. 1 In one sense, the debate is ironic,
considering the care with which the Advisory Committee for the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 addressed the extent and effect of class action
judgments. It is abundantly clear that the Advisory Committee in-
tended that unnamed members be bound when a class has been accu-
rately certified and properly maintained throughout the suit.2 That
1. See Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the
Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 705-06 (1994) (criticizing the
Circuits for employing res judicata standards in the class action context that are
"uncertain" or even "irrational"); Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to Shutts, 46 U. KAN.
L. REV. 727, 736-48 (1998) (describing and criticizing the post-Shutts "mischief'
among the circuits and within the Supreme Court); Barbara A. Winters, Com-
ment, Jurisdiction over Unnamed Plaintiffs in Multistate Class Actions, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 181, 181-83 (1985) (noting disagreement in commentary and in the judici-
ary over issues surrounding preclusion in the multi-state class action context,
pre-Shutts); see also 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1757 (2d ed. 1986). See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit
Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (discussing disagreement in recent cases over a court's au-
thority to issue injunctions against unnamed class members).
2. First, the Advisory Committee identified the "proper extent of the judgments" as
one of the points to clarify in its 1966 revision of Rule 23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee note. Second, the Committee simply stated that "The
amended rule ... provides that all class actions maintained to the end ... will
result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the
class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class." Id. Third, except for
the special provision allowing "opt-outs" in class actions certified under Rule
23(b)(3), the Committee never cast doubt on the binding effect of properly con-
ducted class actions. Id.
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said, however, the Advisory Committee paid little heed to articulating
a sound theoretical basis for binding unnamed class members. Of
course, the Committee did not foresee the frequency and magnitude of
modern damage actions involving loosely bound class members scat-
tered across many states. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in the leading case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts3 brought
little clarity to the debate surrounding the reach of class action
judgments.
In Shutts, a class of oil royalty owners sued Phillips Petroleum, a
Kansas corporation, in a Kansas state court.4 One class representa-
tive was a Kansas resident who owned Kansas land on which Phillips
Petroleum was drilling for oil; another representative was an out-of-
state owner of Kansas land.5 However, the vast majority of unnamed
class members were from states other than Kansas and had no affilia-
tions with the forum state.6 Instead of focusing on the analytical basis
for binding absent class members, the Court became preoccupied with
its response to Phillips Petroleum's personal jurisdiction argument.
Phillips contended that absent plaintiff class members without mini-
mum contacts with the forum state would be deprived of due process if
the Kansas court were able to bind them by its judgment.7 Ulti-
mately, the Court rejected Phillips' position on the ground that since
the class suit in question was the equivalent of a Rule 23(b)(3) action,
it sufficed that the unnamed class members had been afforded the op-
portunity to "opt out."8 Thus, those members who voluntarily re-
mained in the plaintiff class were bound by reason of their consent to
personal jurisdiction.
The Shutts holding is sound enough-the judgment was binding as
long as absent class members could choose to leave the class and, if
they declined, received adequate representation. The International
Shoe9 overtone of the opinion, however, has led to difficulty. The
Shutts opinion can be read as saying that a central consideration (per-
haps the central consideration) in determining the effect of a class ac-
tion judgment on an absent class member is whether she has an
individual affiliation with the forum state sufficient to support in per-
sonam jurisdiction. Thus, even though the Court was careful to point
3. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
4. Id. at 799.
5. Id. at 800-01.
6. Id. at 801.
7. Id. at 806-14.
8. The Court asserted that the failure of absentees to opt out, whether or not they
were within the jurisdiction, was proof of their consent to the Kansas court's
power over their claims. See id. at 812-13.
9. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that territorial
(personal) jurisdiction may be exercised over parties who have minimum contacts
with the forum state).
1010 [Vol. 81:1008
MODELING CLASS ACTIONS
out that it was addressing only the Rule 23(b)(3) action before it, 1o one
could extrapolate from the Shutts opinion the general proposition that
binding unnamed class members is dependent on the existence of an
adequate basis of personal jurisdiction such as presence, minimum
contacts, or consent. 1
This proposition, if accepted, would emasculate the utility of class
actions. It would also reject the historical model of class actions,
which portrays class suits as a specific variety of representative ac-
tions. As such, it is the relationship between the representative (over
whom the court has jurisdiction) and the absent class member that
establishes the res judicata effect of a class judgment. Representation
is a surrogate for personal jurisdiction. To emphasize issues of indi-
vidual personal jurisdiction not only obscures the accepted structure
of class actions, but also deflects attention from the central considera-
tions in such suits. The core inquiries in all class actions are, first, the
assessment of the cohesiveness of the class and, second, the evaluation
of representational adequacy by the named class members and class
counsel.
Even though the Shutts decision is ostensibly confined to class ac-
tions under Rule 23(b)(3) and its state counterparts,12 the Court's
opinion has nonetheless spawned uncertainty and disagreement in a
variety of contexts. An issue of critical importance is whether an ab-
sent, non-resident plaintiff who lacks sufficient contacts with the fo-
rum state is bound in so-called "mandatory" actions under Rule
23(b)(1) or (b)(2). Persons within classes formed under these subsec-
tions of Rule 23 are not afforded an opportunity to leave the class and
possibly pursue an individual action. The status of absent plaintiffs in
mandatory class actions would have come before the Supreme Court
in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown,13 but the Court dismissed the
case on the ground that certiorari had been improvidently granted. 14
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled in Ticor Title that in a
"hybrid" suit-one seeking both equitable relief and substantial
money damages under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2)-absent, non-resident
10. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 804 n.3. The Kansas class action rule was modeled after
Rule 23.
11. Professor Monaghan criticizes the Shutts Court for its focus on the differences
between defendants-the traditional subjects of personal jurisdiction concerns-
and absent plaintiff class members, a focus which gives the appearance of satisfy-
ing the due process concerns raised by petitioners in the case through an "implied
consent" rationale. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1166-70.
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.




plaintiffs must be afforded the opportunity to opt out.15 If they are
not allowed this option, their damage claims remain viable.
In this Article, I begin in Part II by documenting the proposition
that class suits are properly viewed as a subset of representative law-
suits. Case law demonstrates that class actions remain true to the
historical and doctrinal roots of the representative suit. As such, class
actions should be analyzed in much the same way as are other repre-
sentative suits, with the important exception that special account
must be taken of several important differences between class suits
and other kinds of representative actions. 16 The recognition that class
actions constitute a special subset of representative actions is essen-
tial not only to the proper resolution of traditional, straightforward
issues of personal jurisdiction, but also critical to the binding effects of
settlements as well as other class action issues. I next trace the
ramifications of the representative model of class litigations with par-
ticular emphasis on the res judicata effects of class action judgments.
Specifically, in Part III I discuss the similarities and differences be-
tween the traditional representative suits, on the one hand, and class
actions-especially modern class actions-on the other. This Part
then goes on to show how Rule 23 is crafted to bridge the gaps be-
tween traditional representative suits and class suits. From this anal-
ysis, I conclude that, if properly administered, Rule 23 and state rules
modeled after it are constitutional as written.17 It is essential, how-
ever, that these rules be administered with proper regard for the rep-
resentative model in its modified "class action" form. Part III
concludes by showing why the defendant class action, often debated in
the literature, should seldom cause either constitutional or practical
concern. Finally, in Part IV, I analyze particular issues growing out of
the anti-suit injunction and preclusion by judgment. Here especially,
the representative model comes into tension with traditional limits on
15. 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992). Other recent decisions by the Supreme Court
could have lent some guidance as to the binding effect of mandatory class actions,
but the Court declined to broach this issue. Oritz v. Fibreboard Co., 527 U.S. 815
(1999), Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997), and Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), all afforded the
Court an opportunity to formulate a workable theory of res judicata in the class
action context, but the Court failed to take full advantage in any of these cases.
16. For a description of the representative model, see Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 599 (1987). Professor (now
Judge) Wood contributes thoughtful insights into the problems of modern class
actions by constructing a sliding scale of cohesiveness and using concepts of sov-
ereign adjudicatory power and individual liberties to dictate when courts rely on
the representative model. See also infra note 89.
17. A leading case book reports that roughly two-thirds of the states have patterned
their class action rule after Rule 23. ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH,




judicial power. Generally speaking, if the representative-class model
is respected, one forum ("Fl") is not empowered to prevent an absent
class member from challenging, in the forum of her choice ("F2"), an
F1 class judgment based on her contention of inadequate representa-
tion. Nor should a forum court entertaining a class action seeking pri-
marily equitable relief ordinarily be able to preclude individual
damage claims in other jurisdictions.
The first task, however, is to show that the representative model is
historically and analytically sound, that it lies at the core of modern
class actions, and that one of its principal themes is its binding effect.
II. THE REPRESENTATIVE MODEL: A BRIDGE TO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A. Historical Roots of the Representative Model
There seems to be little doubt that, historically, class actions have
been viewed as simply a special variety of representative suits. One
commentator finds the characterization so generally accepted that she
casually remarks, "It is hornbook law that class-action litigation is, by
nature and definition, representational litigation."18 Indeed, it ap-
pears that the leading treatise authorities have uniformly viewed the
class action as a subset of representative litigation.' 9 Professor Her-
bert Newberg, for example, describes the structure of the class action
as a representative suit on behalf of others similarly situated.20 He
goes on to note that because of its representative character, the class
action is an atypical, or "nontraditional" form of litigation.
2 1
Accordingly,
[t]o understand what makes class actions tick, it is important to analyze the
basic nature of class actions, their fundamental characteristics and effects,
and why they exist in modern jurisprudence. When these aspects of class ac-
tions have been analyzed, questions about what process is due for the protec-
tion of absent class members, and how their represented status is reconciled
with traditional litigation rules and principles, can be addressed in a reasona-
bly settled and consistent manner.
2 2
To trace the history of the class action, in fact, is to track the his-
tory of representative or group litigation. Traditionally, legal histori-
ans have traced the roots of the class action to the Bill of Peace, which
originated in seventeenth-century English chancery courts. 23 Re-
cently, Professor Stephen C. Yeazell has challenged this traditional
18. Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due Pro-
cess: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 871, 884 (1995).
19. See, e.g., 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§§ 1.01-1.11 (1992); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1753.
20. See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 19, § 1.01.
21. 1 id.
22. 1 id. (emphasis added).
23. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 157-164 (1950).
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view by mustering historical evidence that group litigation developed
gradually as an outgrowth of communal harms within English feudal
social structures. 24 Yeazell cautions, therefore, that the history of
group or representative litigation is not seamless, but rather follows
the contours of social history and political ideology.
Even if Yeazell's view is accepted, medieval group litigation gave
form to the model of judicial representation as an alternative to typi-
cal "self-asserted" lawsuits. Although the early representative suits,
whether in feudal tribunals or chancery courts, may have relied for
legitimacy on preexisting relationships between the representative
and the represented,25 it is still true that these early English procedu-
ral devices developed into the modern class action and gave rise to the
core concept of class cohesion. By the nineteenth century, groups
given access to courts under representational procedural forms in-
cluded creditors, legatees, unincorporated associations, and specified
groups with interests in real property. 26 These various associated liti-
gants constituted both plaintiff and defendant classes. 2 7 Moreover,
American judges and legal scholars incorporated into nineteenth-cen-
tury doctrine the principles that justify representative legitimacy,
thus laying the groundwork for the 1938 Federal Rule governing class
actions. 28
The Supreme Court's early conception of class actions confirms
both their representative nature and their endemic characteristic of a
binding judgment.29 The first notable case legitimizing the class suit
was Smith v. Swormstedt, decided by the Court in 1853.30 There, a
24. See STEPHEN C. Yeazell, FROM MEDIEVAL GRouP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 41-58 (1987). Professor Yeazell thoroughly discusses the power dy-
namic, expressed in manorial courts, between medieval village groups and their
lords and concludes, "[t]o understand the social and political context of the village
cases is to question easy analogies between early group litigation and the modern
class action. The differences flow from features of the social organization [of the
villages]." Id. at 57.
25. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
866, 867, 877 (1977).
26. See Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1861 (1998).
27. See YEAZELL, supra note 25, at 880-81; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1751.
28. See Hazard et al., supra note 26, at 1878.
29. In a revealing and scholarly article, Professors Hazard, Gedid, and Sowle show
that both English and American courts have taken inconsistent positions on the
binding effect of class judgments. See id. at 1849-58. My thesis is, however, that
in the latter half of the twentieth century-and even before-the Supreme Court
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have endorsed preclusion by judgement
in class actions.
30. 57 U.S. 288 (1853). Smith was preceded by Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 565, 584-85(1829), in which the Supreme Court allowed some members of a voluntary associ-
ation to sue on behalf of all without joinder of all informal members. Beatty, how-
ever, did not provide for the same far-reaching class framework that Smith did.
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plaintiff class from the southern branch of the Methodist Episcopal
Church sued a defendant class of traveling ministers from the north-
ern branch of the church.31 The plaintiffs sought their equitable
share of a publishing business to which the defendants asserted exclu-
sive ownership. In the course of approving the party structure, the
Court articulated the framework for the modern class action. Signifi-
cantly, Justice Nelson concluded that when the interested parties are
numerous and have a common objective in bringing suit, "some of the
body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the others; and
a bill may be maintained against... [a] body of defendants, represent-
ing a common interest."32 Other passages in the Smith opinion indi-
cate that the Court assumed a valid judgment would be binding on the
entire class.3 3 For example, the Court stated that "a court of equity
permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire
body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before
the court."34 Finally, the Court's opinion appears to have been highly
influenced by Justice Story's Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, in
which he cited the English Bill of Peace as the ancestor of American
class actions.3 5
The first federal class action rule was patterned after existing uses
and understandings of the class suit. In the original Rule 23 there
were three "categories" of class actions, commonly known as "true,"
"hybrid," and "spurious." This tripartite scheme, however, proved un-
workable. The abstractness and overlapping nature of the so-called
"jural" relationships among the three classes blurred the distinctions
that supposedly defined them. Furthermore, the spurious class action
proved to be of limited practical value because it did not bind absent
members unless they intervened. Of course, when the federal class
action rule was revised in 1966, the drafters used functional criteria to
create the three categories of classes familiarly known as Rule
23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). They also included the now-familiar opt-out
provision for absent class members, but this escape provision was
carefully confined to the least cohesive-(b)(3)-class. As noted ear-
lier, it strongly appears that the Advisory Committee intended all
class judgments to be binding on both representatives and absentee
class members, with the exception of absentees electing to withdraw
under the "opt-out" provisions of (b)(3).36 This decision by the Coin-
31. See Smith, 57 U.S. at 288.
32. Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added).
33. See id; see also Hazard et al., supra note 26, at 1899-1902; id. at 1901-02 (point-
ing out that Equity Rule 48, the rule in force at the time pertaining to the use of
this procedural device in federal courts, did not allow absent class members to be
bound by a class judgment).
34. See Smith, 57 U.S. at 303.
35. See Hazard et al., supra note 26, at 1899.
36. See supra note 2. The opt-out provision is actually found in Rule 23(c)(2).
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mittee is a recognition that although class actions are founded on the
representative model, special account must be taken of the unique fea-
tures of class representation.
B. Modern Doctrine: Personal Jurisdiction Over the Class
Representative
Important implications arise from the baseline characterization of
the class suit as "representative litigation." For instance, the applica-
tion of traditional doctrine governing representative suits dictates
that, generally, a court must have personal jurisdiction only over the
named representative to assert proper jurisdiction over the entire
"class" of represented persons.3 7 Major twentieth century Supreme
Court cases involving class actions, as well as the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments, support this position. 38 Significantly, the Restate-
ment aligns the class action with other kinds of representative suits,
such as those filed by a guardian, trustee, or similar fiduciary.3 9 The
Restatement's characterization of the class suits finds support in an
early leading case, Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, decided by
the Supreme Court in 1921.40 Here, again, the Court emphatically
confirmed the accepted principle that the named class member (the
class representative) litigates not only for herself, but for the class as
well.
In Ben Hur, members of a fraternal benefit association sued the
association, a citizen of Indiana, to enjoin the illegal use of trust funds
and prevent reorganization of the Supreme Tribe.41 The plaintiff
37. The old "impracticability" standard allowed courts to assert jurisdiction over rep-
resented parties although the courts could not have jurisdiction over them as in-
dividuals absent represented status. See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 19,
§ 3.03; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1762; Charles Donelan, Prerequisites to
a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. IND. & COMP. L. REV. 527, 531 (1969).
38. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356
(1921); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(1)(e) cmt. f (1972) (stating
that a represented person who is beyond the jurisdiction of the court is still bound
by the judgment when the court has properly asserted jurisdiction over the repre-
sentative). Although the Restatement also notes that the named class member
must be more carefully scrutinized than other types of representatives because
the class representative's status is "voluntary and non-contractual," presumably
once the representative survives this scrutiny, the traditional doctrinal notions of
representation are applied to class actions. In questions of venue, for example,
only the convenience of the named representative matters-proper venue for all
class members is not required. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1757. The
same is true of federal subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity-only the
citizenship of the named class members is used to determine if "diversity jurisdic-
tion" exists. See infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(1)(e)(1) (1972).
40. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
41. See id. at 360-61.
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class, however, included unnamed class members who shared a com-
mon citizenship with the Indiana defendant, thus possibly destroying
diversity.42 After the defendant prevailed on the merits, some of the
unnamed members, all Indiana citizens, filed separate class suits, con-
tending that they could not be bound by the judgment in the earlier
class action. They argued that since subject matter jurisdiction in the
original class suit was based on diversity, their inclusion as class
members would have destroyed complete diversity. The narrow ques-
tion in Ben Hur, then, was jurisdictional: whether a district court can
assert subject-matter jurisdiction in a case founded on diversity when
some unnamed members of the plaintiff class share the defendant's
citizenship. 43 Noting that the early case of Stewart v. Dunham44 was
controlling, the Court held that diversity jurisdiction was not de-
stroyed so long as there was complete diversity between the class rep-
resentatives and the defendant. 4 5 Especially noteworthy is the
following passage, in which Justice Day characterized the case before
the Court as
peculiarly one which could only be prosecuted by a part of those interested
suing for all in a representative suit. Diversity of citizenship gave the District
Court jurisdiction. Indiana citizens were of the class represented; their rights
were duly represented by those before the court. The intervention of the Indi-
ana citizens in the suit would not have defeated the jurisdiction already
acquired.
4 6
Justice Day then reiterated the point, suggesting that all the par-
ties had their day in court:
The parties and the subject matter are within the court's jurisdiction. It is
impossible to name all of the class as parties, where, as here, its membership
is too numerous to bring into court .... The parties bringing the suit truly
represented the interested class. If a decree is to be effective and conflicting
judgments are to be avoided, all of the class must be concluded by the
decree. 4
7
Thus, although Ben Hur holds only that subject-matter jurisdiction
over the main claim is established by the respective citizenships of the
class representatives and the defendant(s), the Court's emphatic as-
sertion that the absent class members were "truly represented" and
"concluded by the decree" is both a clear endorsement of the represen-
tative model and a strong indication that those "truly" represented
will be bound. It remained to be seen, however, whether internal con-
flicts and tensions within the class can so weaken the prototypical rep-
resentative model that it can no longer be sustained.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 360.
44. 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
45. See Ben Hur, 255 U.S. at 365-67.
46. Id. at 366 (emphasis added) (citing Stewart, 115 U.S. 61).
47. Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
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Hansberry v. Lee48 is the next major and, perhaps, the seminal
class action case to reach the Supreme Court. The case involved the
res judicata effect of a state court decree, on behalf of a plaintiff class,
enforcing a racially restrictive covenant affecting a neighborhood in
Cook County, Illinois.49 Some five years after this initial suit, another
class suit was filed, this time seeking enforcement of the covenant
against different parties, including the Hansberrys, who were minor-
ity purchasers. The defendants asserted that the restrictive covenant
was invalid for the reason that it had never been properly and law-
fully adopted by the landowners. This defense was rejected by the Illi-
nois state courts on the ground the issue of validity was concluded by
the first class suit in which the present defendants had been repre-
sented as (plaintiff) class members. The Court decided that even
though the Hansberry petitioners might be embraced within the pur-
ported plaintiff class, the petitioners nonetheless were not bound by
the prior judgment if their interests significantly diverged from those
of the class representative and other class members. In essence, the
representative model failed because the class in the first suit lacked
the cohesion essential to a binding class action.
However, as to the history and theory of the class suit, the Han-
sberry Court remarked:
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process [citing Pennoyer v. Neff]. A judgment rendered in such circumstances
is not entitled to the full faith and credit which the Constitution and statute of
the United States prescribe, and judicial action enforcing it against the person
or property of the absent party is not that due process which the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments requires [sic].
To these general rules there is a recognized exception that, to an extent not
precisely defined by judicial opinion, the judgment in a 'class' or 'representa-
tive' suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind members
of the class or those represented who were not made parties to it. [citing,
among other cases, Smith v. Swormstedt].5 0
For present purposes, the importance of this dictum is obvious. Not
only is the class action a representative suit, but the essential nature
of a properly framed suit permits a court to bind absent class members
even though they are not subject to service of process. 5 1 In the same
vein, the Court went on to note that "[iut is familiar doctrine in the
48. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
49. See id. at 37.
50. Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
51. At another point in the Hansberry dicta, the Court noted that the class suit is like
a host of other types of litigation where
courts are ... called upon to proceed with causes in which the number of
those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or impos-
sible the joinder of all or because some are not within the jurisdiction or
because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all were made parties
1018 [Vol. 81:1008
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federal courts that members of a class not present as parties to the
litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact ade-
quately represented by parties who are present."5 2 State courts, too,
said the Court, are free to fashion class action rules that bind absen-
tees, subject only to the constitutional restraint that the "procedure
adopted fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent
parties."53
Finally, additional evidence of the Court's consistent position re-
garding the framework of class suits may be found in Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,5 4 a 1996 case in which the Court,
quoting favorably from the decision below, reiterated the basic pro-
position that "all members of the class . . . are bound by the [class]
judgment . . . unless, in a Rule 23(b)(3) action, they make a timely
election for exclusion."5 5 It thus seems plain enough that throughout
the history of the modern class action in the United States, the Su-
preme Court has accepted the binding effect of the class judgment on
absentees.
III. THE REPRESENTATIVE FRAMEWORK AND RULE 23
A. Representative Suits Generally
The category "representative litigation" embraces a range of suits,
including, for example, those by trustees, executors, administrators,
conservators, guardians, various fiduciaries, unincorporated associa-
tions, and (as we have seen) class representatives. 5 6 Prototypical rep-
resentative suits tend to share a number of important characteristics,
although there are occasional exceptions and qualifications.5 7 The
representative usually sues not on behalf of herself, but only on behalf
to the suit its continued abatement by the death of some would prevent
or unduly delay a decree.
311 U.S. at 41 (emphasis added). Barbara A. Winters argues that this phrase
does not mean the Court meant that the Court can extend its jurisdiction by way
of the class suit, but rather simply means that the person is not located in the
jurisdiction at the time. See Winters, supra note 1, at 196. However, other com-
ments in dicta as well as the tone of Hansberry cast doubt on this position.
52. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42-43.
53. See id. at 43.
54. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
55. Id. at 367 (citing HERBERT NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 2755 (1977)).
56. Representative suits may also include so-called "virtual representation," al-
though this is not a traditional kind of representative lawsuit. "Virtual represen-
tation" is a doctrinally suspect method of precluding absent third parties
unaware, ex ante, that certain litigation would preclude them from bringing their
own claims or defending themselves directly. See generally 18A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4457 (2d ed. 2002); Jack L.
Johnson, Due or Voodoo Process: Virtual Representation as a Justification for Pre-
clusion of the Nonparty's Claim, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1303 (1994).
57. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 4455.
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of the represented party. The pleadings clarify, at the beginning of
the litigation, that the action is representative in character.5 8 Moreo-
ver, the representative usually is not bound personally by the judg-
ment issued for or against her charge because she asserts no personal
claim or defense in the action. 59 Next, most representative relation-
ships originate in preexisting relationships between the representa-
tives and the represented. The presence of such relationships
suggests common interests and, perhaps in many instances, prelitiga-
tion knowledge that is mutually shared. Furthermore, the nature of
these relationships is, broadly speaking, consensual. Depending on
the circumstances, consent of the represented parties or of an appro-
priate judicial body sympathetic to the wishes of the represented par-
ties may be required.6o Finally, the representative typically has a
fiduciary obligation to her charge, and she may be held liable for a
breach of that duty.6 1 This potential liability provides at least one
incentive (often, of course, there are others) for the representative to
prosecute vigorously the claims or defenses of her charge.6 2
B. Class Actions as Representative Suits
Class actions differ from typical representative suits in certain sig-
nificant respects. These differences may pose questions in several dis-
tinct litigation contexts, thus suggesting that the answers are often
contextual. For example, the issue of whether a class action structure
alters the usual rule governing necessary parties is analytically dis-
tinct from the question of whether absentees are bound by a class
judgment. In any event, the difference between class actions and typi-
cal representative suits prompted the authors of a leading treatise to
describe the class action as "more modern and less certain" than tradi-
tional representative suits. 6 3 Note that in many modern class actions,
the class representative and absent class members have no relation-
ship prior to the suit, thus decreasing the likelihood that the represen-
58. See 18A id. § 4454.
59. See 18A id.
60. See 18A id.
61. See 18A id.
62. For example, in the course of his representation, the fiduciary may develop obli-
gations or acquire rights of action of his own, apart from his role as representa-
tive. In such cases, the representative's own cases may be joined with the case of
the principal or decedent for trial, although they remain analytically distinct. A
fiduciary is generally not liable for the performance of a contract entered into as a
representative unless he deceived the other party about his representative capac-
ity. Additionally, failure to differentiate between the individual and representa-
tive nature of the action in pleading is generally susceptible to amendment and is
not fatal as long as the nature of the suit is clear in context. See, e.g., 2 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 11-4.1.1 (1992).
63. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 4455.
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tation is implicitly or explicitly consensual. In short, the litigated
event often gives form to the contours of the class. Furthermore, un-
like the usual representative or fiduciary, the class representative
sues on her own behalf as well as on behalf of the absentees. 6 4 Some
observers note that the so-called "personal stake" requirement 6 5 in it-
self usually ensures adequate representation because the named class
member's stake in the claim triggers self-interested behavior, thus en-
suring the vigorous prosecution (or defense) of class claims.66 That
proposition, however, is likely to be true only in cases where the repre-
sentative's personal claim is substantial. Furthermore, in cases where
the class representative's claim is large, there is a risk that he might
favor his own claim (for example, by the terms of a settlement) over
the claims of unnamed members. 67
C. Binding the Absentee: Class Cohesion and Judicial
Oversight
Although distinguishable in some important respects from the typ-
ical representative lawsuit, a properly executed class suit still oper-
64. Some commentators have argued that it is precisely the self-interest of the class
representative that ensures absentees adequate representation or due process.
See Gilbert J. Birnbrich, Forcing Round Classes into Square Rules: Attempting
Certification of Nicotine-Addiction-as-Injury Class Actions Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 699, 706 (1998); Downs, supra note 1,
at 658. Many courts, however, have described class representatives as "fiducia-
ries," which necessarily implies a duty beyond self-interested behavior. See, e.g.,
Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2000);
Transpac Drilling Venture v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 147 F.3d 221, 225 (2d
Cir. 1998); Sondel v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 1995). But
see Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, 193 F.3d 415, 434 n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that
"even if class representatives are legally accountable [through a fiduciary duty] to
putative members, I would discount the legal relationship that flows solely from
the class relationship. To do otherwise is to penalize attempted class forma-
tion."). The Supreme Court typically has not focused explicitly on the role of the
class representative or his relationship with the class, but the Court has de-
scribed the class representative as a champion who seeks to "vindicate the rights
of individuals who otherwise might not consider it worth the candle to embark on
litigation in which the optimum result might be more than consumed by the
cost." Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980).
65. See, e.g., Roper, 445 U.S. at 340; In re Milk Prod. Antitrust Litig., 195 F.3d 430,
434 (8th Cir. 1999).
66. For example, "[tihe heart of the rationale that the class representative must ade-
quately represent the class is the notion that the court must be satisfied that the
class representative, by litigating his or her personal claim, will also necessarily
be litigating common claims that are shared by the class." 1 NEWBERG & CONTE,
supra note 19, §1.06. Moreover, Professor Newberg cites sources relying dis-
tinctly on self-interest arguments. See 1 id. at n.38.
67. Similarly, large claim plaintiffs in settlement have "much leverage over a group
wide deal" possibly leading to their overcompensation. See Lynn A. Baker &
Charles Silver, The Aggregate Settlement Rule and Ideals of Client Service, 41 S.
TEX. L. REV. 227, 243-44 (1999).
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ates generally to bind the absent class members to the judgment. In
fact, for a class action to function as a useful procedural device, it ordi-
narily must bind absent class members. 6S Some commentators have
addressed the imperfections in "representative" class actions by char-
acterizing these actions as something other than representative litiga-
tion.6 9 This recharacterization is one means of illuminating the
peculiar characteristics of class suits, which must be taken account of
if class actions are to be properly analyzed and understood. The ap-
proach taken here is to begin the analysis with the recognition that
representation remains the essence of the class suit, even though class
actions have unique features. From this premise, it is readily ob-
served that Rule 23 and other similarly patterned class action rules
are designed to compensate for the lack of complete congruence be-
tween class actions and other representative suits. In other words,
Rule 23 and its state counterparts are structured such that factors
other than preexisting relationships, expedited intra-class communi-
cation, and traditional fiduciary duties toward a limited number of
readily identifiable persons lend legitimacy to class-wide judgments.
Several critical phases of a proper class action are designed to ensure
that the due process rights of absent class members will remain se-
cure absent the typical features of representative litigation. First, the
class action must be structured so that the class represented (and
each subclass) is sufficiently cohesive. Second, there must be ade-
quate representation of absent class members throughout the class
suit litigation. Third, close judicial monitoring is essential. Finally, in
certain situations-namely where a class or subclass is not suffi-
ciently cohesive-notice and an opportunity to opt-out of the suit are
required in order to bind absentees to the class judgment. The subsec-
tions that follow elaborate these principles. It suffices to emphasize
here that the principal responsibility of ensuring that a class action is
properly conducted falls upon the court. Neither the parties, nor coun-
sel have incentives that perfectly align with the judicial systems'
objectives in permitting class actions. Left to its own adversarial de-
vices, the representative class action is likely to fall short of constitu-
tional adequacy.
68. See, e.g., 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 4455.
69. For example, some have relied on an "entity model" of class suits, which de-em-
phasizes the role of the "token" class representative and takes class actions as we
currently find them-as lawyer-centered litigation where an "entity," rather than
an individual, is the true client. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The Class as Party
and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917-18 (1998); Edward H. Cooper, Rule
23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26-32 (1996).
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1. The Evolution and Centrality of Class Cohesion
Class cohesion describes the extent to which the claims, defenses,
and injuries "common" to the class are indeed congruent or coinciden-
tal.70 At an early date, courts restricted class suits to the highly cohe-
sive form often described as the "community of interest."7 1 In this
traditional posture, the class as a group laid claim to an "indivisible
interest." This tightly knit class may be contrasted with modern clas-
ses in which more loosely related individual claims have been aggre-
gated into a single package of litigation.72 Even though the
traditional, narrow view of class appropriateness assured courts of a
close identity of legal and factual postures, it proved unduly restric-
tive. Although it is true that those who can assert a collective right
have, essentially, congruent claims, the question in a modern context
is how much variance will be tolerated before it becomes impermissi-
ble for named parties to represent not only their own interests, but
also those of the class. Of course, if wide variation exists in only some
aspects of an action, the class can be certified for cohesive issues
only.7 3 It is not unusual, however, to encounter suits filed as class
actions which contain disparate factual and legal postures within the
putative class.74 These loosely cohesive suits are most often found in
modern mass torts cases which are usually certified-if at all-under
70. Professor Coffee criticizes the theory that "class cohesion"-or "descriptive repre-
sentation"-ensures representational adequacy as one which is misguided and
focuses too much on loyalty between absentee class member and representative
and not enough on controlling agency costs. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Representative Litigation,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000). While I agree that the theory of class cohesion is
imperfect, it nonetheless provides a useful theoretical basis for the class action
and avoids the need to assess agency costs and other cost-benefit relationships.
71. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions (pt. 4), 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1332-
37 (1976).
72. See id. at 1332.
73. For instance, liability and damages are often separated between the class and
individual claims. See, e.g., Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, Local
201, 170 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th
Cir. 1992). But see Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that bifurcation of liability and damages stages violated the defendant's Sev-
enth Amendment rights because the second stage allowed the jury to reexamine
issues of liability).
74. The story of tobacco litigation in the 1990s shows the problems created when
courts certify only minimally cohesive classes in the "mass tort" context. See gen-
erally Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336 (1999). In fact, mass torts have been the obsession of
many, many commentators of class actions-particularly since very few mass tort
actions were certified under Rule 23 until the last two decades. For a description
of the evolution of mass torts in the class action context, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343,
1358-64 (1995). A major subject of criticism has been the increasing willingness
of courts to certify sprawling, global mass tort cases for settlement purposes only.
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Rule 23(b)(3), thus allowing individual members the option of leaving
the class. Interestingly, the drafters of the 1966 revision of Rule 23
took the position that mass tort suits should not ordinarily be litigated
in the class format.7 5 Nonetheless, in recent years, more of these ac-
tions have been certified, placing considerable strain on traditional
class action principles and practices.
Lack of shared identity among members of the class indicates that
some members, if putatively precluded by the judgment, will not have
been adequately represented by the named class representatives. Be-
cause individuals within the class may have claims or defenses that do
not coincide with those of other class members or, more importantly,
with those of the representatives, an absentee may face a judgment
insufficiently based on the individual issues affecting his litigating
posture. 76 While, as noted above, lack of congruence is often found in
the mass tort context, the victims of a mass accident sometimes have
such congruence of claims or some portion thereof-such as defen-
dant's liability-that a class action structure seems entirely appropri-
ate.77 Such a case might exist, for example, where numerous hotel
guests allege injuries caused when agents of the hotel negligently
caused a fire. Here, a class could be appropriately certified on the is-
sue of liability. 78
The point is that the degree of class cohesion-not the type of suit
or even the type of relief sought-is the essential feature in determin-
ing when class certification is proper. Indeed, the Supreme Court af-
firmed this proposition as recently as 1997, when it pointedly
remarked that "class cohesion... legitimizes representative actions in
the first place." 79 The Federal Rule's "prerequisites" to certification of
any class-numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate repre-
sentation-seem to overlap for the precise reason that, with the excep-
See, e.g., Susan Koniak & George C. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1051, 1122-30 (1996); Coffee, supra, at 1378-83.
75. In their notes, the Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23 specu-
lated that "[a] mass 'accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordina-
rily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee note. The Committee expected that concerns over cohesion would
foreclose any mass tort class action. See id.
76. Clearly, to have certain critical issues not presented to the court because such a
wide variation exists among the class would be to deny the absentee his "day in
court"-albeit through a representative-which the Supreme Court has endorsed
as a "deep-rooted historic tradition" in our system ofjustice. Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
77. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Haley v.
Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
78. See Wood, supra note 16, at 617. Professor Wood refers illustratively in her arti-
cle to In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).
79. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997).
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tion of numerosity, they attempt to describe the general quality of
"cohesion or unity."so As noted above, the Supreme Court obscured
the cohesion principle in Shutts when it apparently based its holding
upon personal jurisdiction and the type of relief sought (i.e., damages)
rather than class cohesiveness.S1 Unfortunately, several courts of ap-
peals interpreting Shutts have likewise elided the principle of class
cohesion and have instead drawn bright line standards based entirely
on the type of relief sought rather than the nature of the class certi-
fied.82 This is not to say that the kind of relief sought is irrelevant to
the issue of class cohesion; it is only to say that the relief sought is not
the exclusive factor to consider in addressing the issue of cohesion
within a putative class. For example, relief by an injunction instead of
damages is often a useful, although rough, proxy for the degree of
class cohesion.
In several recent decisions,S3 the Supreme Court has stressed the
importance of class cohesiveness in fulfilling the requirements of Rule
23, but has neglected to emphasize the overall structural and theoreti-
cal importance of cohesion. For instance, in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, a case in the protracted national asbestos litigation, the
Court explicitly linked class cohesion to the predominance require-
ment of Rule 23(b)(3).84 The district court in Amchem had certified a
plaintiff class for settlement purposes without first addressing and
satisfying the requirements governing certification for trial. That is,
the trial judge certified the class for settlement purposes without
heeding the demanding certification requirements imposed by Rule
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1966).
81. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
82. In Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth
Circuit held that a judgment for injunctive relief in a class action certified under
(b)(1) or (2) doesn't prevent subsequent claims for money damages based on same
transaction. Likewise, in Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership, 151 F.3d 1234,
1240 (9th Cir. 1998), the court avoided classifying the (b)(2) action as one "Wholly
or predominantly" for money damages by valuing the injunctive relief at $20.9
million to $34.2 million and the settlement fund for damages at $6 million. Thus,
the objecting plaintiffs' charge that class counsel were inadequate in part because
they failed to request opt-out procedures failed because the action could be char-
acterized by the appellate court as primarily seeking injunctive relief. See id.
The New York Court of Appeals held in Colt Industries Shareholder Litigation,
566 N.E.2d 1160, 1166-67 (N.Y. 1991), that Shutts did not preclude a mandatory
class action which seeks primarily equitable relief, but did find that the New
York court could not preclude an absent, nonresident plaintiff lacking contacts
with New York from instituting another action for damages in a different
jurisdiction.
83. Oritz v. Fibreboard Co., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
84. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-24.
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23, sections (a) and (b).85 Nonetheless, the trial judge did at least de-
termine that the putative class was within subsection (b)(3) of Rule
23, which requires that "questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members."8 6 In upholding the Third Circuit's decertification of
the class, the Supreme Court noted the lack of class cohesiveness.8 7 It
then quoted with approval the appellate court's conclusions that
[class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for
different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some
class members suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural
changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from
mesothelioma .... Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor
that complicates the causation inquiry.
The [exposure-only] plaintiffs especially share little in common, either
with each other or with the presently injured class members. It is unclear
whether they will contract asbestos-related disease and, if so, what disease
each will suffer. They will also incur different medical expenses because their
monitoring and treatment will depend on singular circumstances and individ-
ual medical histories.88
Thus, although the Court correctly emphasized cohesiveness, it ap-
pears to do so in the context of the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3). But cohesiveness should not be so confined, for it actually
pervades Rule 23 and provides the unifying rationale for its imple-
mentation.8 9 Its constituent parts are, essentially, commonality of
questions of law and fact and typicality of claims or defenses in the
sense that the legal and factual postures of the class representatives
are typical of the legal and factual postures of the represented class.
Implicit in the requirements of commonality and typicality is the ab-
sence of conflicts within the class or between the class and the class
representative(s).
85. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that predominance and commonality of
claims and adequacy of representation were severely lacking in the case, which
included a sprawling class of present and future claimants injured in a variety of
ways. See id. at 622-28.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
87. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.
88. Id. at 624.
89. Professor Wood makes similar suggestions regarding the theoretical utility of the
cohesiveness concept. In her framework, the level of cohesiveness determines
whether an action fits the representational or joinder model of the class action.
See Wood, supra note 16, at 599-607. Her ideas differ from mine, however, in
that she would allow the class action procedural device to encompass more loosely
cohesive actions than would I, and in that she conceptualizes due process rights
via a sort of "sliding scale" approach based on cohesiveness, whereas I would
characterize rights as simply fixed. Professor Coffee, of course, raises objections
to emphasizing cohesiveness, see Coffee, supra note 74, but his analysis may sim-
ply be a recharacterization of the problems arising from loosely cohesive classes,
particularly since he suggests some similar technical reforms to improve repre-
sentation and reduce agency costs.
1026 [Vol. 81:1008
MODELING CLASS ACTIONS
2. Essential Monitoring Through Judicial Oversight
Judicial oversight of class litigation is the critical procedural check
to keep class suits within the outlines of the representative model and
the bounds of due process. Unlike traditional suits (including many
representative suits), in which courts allow parties to protect and
manage their own interests, class litigation calls upon the judge to
actively manage the suit in order to protect the rights of absentees. 90
The unnamed class members did not, after all, choose the class repre-
sentative(s) to advance their interests in the litigation. Furthermore,
it often happens that the class members and the representative(s) had
no common membership in a group sharing many similar interests,
such as a labor union or a fraternal organization. It thus falls upon
the judge, first, to ensure that a class (or subclass) is sufficiently ho-
mogenous and, second, to ensure that throughout the suit the class
representative(s) vigorously asserts the interests of absentee class
members. Obviously, it does not suffice that the class representative
has claims similar to the unnamed class members or that other typical
class action prerequisites, such as numerosity, are present. These
alone do not ensure adequate representation, which depends upon
both meeting the necessary cohesiveness of a proper class and faithful
and vigorous representation throughout the litigation. The problem of
securing and sustaining forceful representation is exacerbated in
"small claims" class actions, where the individual value of the litiga-
tion to each class member is insubstantial. The risk is that class coun-
sel will not be adequately supervised by the named class members,
thus increasing the odds that representation will be desultory and in-
effective, or that class counsel will resolve the case in a manner that
optimizes attorneys' fees rather than maximizing settlement value to
individual class members. 9 1 In any event, the drafters of Rule 23 pro-
90. Some commentators have criticized the current state of judicial management, or
lack thereof, in many class action cases. See Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort
Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2010-11 (1999) (asserting
that even though settlement class actions need strong judicial oversight, imple-
menting a judicial management strategy would be "destined for failure ... be-
cause U.S. judges are ill-equipped for effective inquisitorial judging"); Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAvis. L. REV. 805, 829 (1997) (re-
marking that it would be misguided to invest a great deal of trust in judicial
control of class suits because "[n]o matter how virtuous the judge, the fact re-
mains that courts are overworked, they have limited access to quality informa-
tion, and they have an overwhelming incentive to clear their docket [especially
via quick settlement]. They cannot reliably police the day-to-day interests of ab-
sent class members.").
91. See George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 530 (1997); Coffee, supra note 74, at 1367-84. For
an interesting "case study" on this issue, see Paula Batt Wilson, Attorney Invest-
ment in Class Action Litigation: The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 291 (1994). See also Downs, supra note 1, at 661-69 (discussing the
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vided a significant measure of judicial oversight for all class actions,
including, for example, discretion to the certifying court to create sub-
classes, to provide notice to class members throughout the litigation
and, of course, to decertify a class. 9 2 In modern class actions, it is
critically important that the court assume an active supervisory role.
In at least three recent cases, the Supreme Court has strongly en-
dorsed close judicial oversight.9 3 This requirement of careful supervi-
sion is, moreover, quite consistent with the Court's historical
recognition of the representative nature of class actions.9 4 In Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor,95 as we have seen, the Court strongly criti-
cized the laxity with which the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certi-
fied an asbestos class action settlement. It rebuffed the district court's
off-handed rejection of the "strenuous objections" made by absentees
at the hearing that preceded settlement approval and the trial court's
indifference to creating subclasses.9 6 Justice Ginsburg characterized
subclassing as an effective tool of judicial management and registered
the Court's stern disapproval of the district court's view that
"[s]ubclasses were unnecessary ... bearing in mind the added cost and
confusion [such subclasses] would entail and the ability of class mem-
bers to exclude themselves from the class during the three-month opt-
out period."97 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that creating
subclasses was at least one of the required judicial means of ensuring
fair and adequate representation in the factual and legal context of
Amchem.98
Similarly, the Court's opinion in Oritz v. Fibreboard Co.99 should
be read as promoting increased judicial management and scrutiny of
class actions, particularly in the settlement context under Rule
23(b)(1)(B).100 Oritz, like Amchem, was an asbestos case, but with an
problems of financial conflicts between class counsel and the class and the
problems inherent in current fee calculation methods).
92. Rule 23(c)(4)(B) allows for subclassing, while 23(d) gives the court discretion to
frame various orders, including discretionary notice under 23(d)(2) and decertifi-
cation under 23(d)(4). Also, the certifying court may alter certification under
23(c)(1), must supervise provision of mandatory notice to under 23(c)(2), and
must approve any settlement of class claims under 23(e). Subdivision 23(c)(3)
allows the court, when issuing a final judgment, to define the class in a way that
avoids challenges to the res judicata effect of the judgment.
93. See Oritz v. Fibreboard Co., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367
(1996).
94. See supra notes 29-56 and accompanying text.
95. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
96. See id. at 606-08.
97. Id. at 608.
98. See id. at 625-28.
99. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
100. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) allows for a class action under the "limited fund" rationale.
When a defendant does not have enough resources to compensate all injured par-
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interesting twist: to prevent an adverse judgment from leading to
bankruptcy, defendant Fibreboard was willing to settle under the lim-
ited fund rationale of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), provided the plaintiffs accepted
the value of Fibreboard's liability insurance as the "limited fund" at
stake.lOl When the case reached the Supreme Court, not only did the
Court closely examine the history and policy behind 23(b)(1)(B)-a
policy requiring that only properly constituted classes be certi-
fied1O2-but it pointedly criticized the trial court for its cursory treat-
ment of the settlement:
The record on which the District Court rested its certification of the class for
the purpose of the global settlement did not support the essential premises of
mandatory limited fund actions. It failed to demonstrate that the fund was
limited except by the agreement of the parties .... 103
The Court was especially troubled by the fact that the district court
"simply accepted the $2 billion Trilateral Settlement Agreement fig-
ure as representing the maximum amount the insurance companies
could be required to pay" without further inquiry into the accuracy of
those figures.10 4 In establishing this rigorous standard for judicial
oversight of the 23(b)(1)(B) settlement, the Oritz Court seemed driven
by the potential for abuse and the risk of inadequate representation
during the settlement process, a point in the litigation at which the
adversarial nature of litigation merges into a more accommodating
state of negotiation.10 5
Implicitly or explicitly, the march of recent Supreme Court cases is
toward a strict requirement: judicial control is essential to ensure that
the interests of absentees are protected. This means that the presid-
ing judge must closely examine the legal and factual postures of those
within the putative class to determine their degree of correspondence.
Beyond this, the judge must closely monitor the adequacy of represen-
tation by the class representative and class counsel. These factors de-
termine the preclusive effect of a class action judgment-not, as
Shutts could be read to suggest-the presence of personal jurisdiction.
ties, a class judgment may be preferable to a set of individual judgments in which
plaintiffs race to drain the finite resources of the defendant, leaving "late" plain-
tiffs with a judgment-proof defendant.
101. See Oritz, 527 U.S. at 828.
102. See id. at 832-37.
103. Id. at 848.
104. Id. at 851.
105. See id. at 838-41 (describing the possible intraclass conflicts of interest arising




3. The Role of Notice
Notice106 has several possible roles in class actions. First, in some
class suits, namely those certified under Rule 23(b)(3), notice is re-
quired by the Rule itself. Second, in a limited number of cases where
Rule 23 does not require notice, the Constitution's Due Process Clause
may demand it.107 Third, even though in some class suits notice may
neither be a rule-based nor a constitutional requirement, it may none-
theless be a powerful instrument for effective judicial oversight of
class cohesion and adequate representation. As such, it should be fre-
quently employed.1os
The efficacy of notice has been the subject of much debate. Some
observers argue that notice does not in fact encourage actual partici-
pation of absentees in class litigation.109 That is, the obstacles of
106. I use the term "meaningful notice" to describe notice with constitutionally suffi-
cient content-notice that actually informs absent class members of their stake
and their rights in the litigation. Suffice it to say that theoretically, a technically
sufficient notice that "is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections" does in fact exist. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). It is this form of notice with which I am
concerned here.
107. The Mullane Court stated:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of
the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum
they require that deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the na-
ture of the case.
339 U.S. at 313. Also, the leading case ofEisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 175-77 (1974), proceeds on the theory that notice is a requirement of due
process even in cases where individual claims are small and few members may in
fact elect to opt out, because only individualized notice may afford unnamed class
members the opportunity to withdraw from the representation. The opportunity
to opt out concerned the Court very much, both from a constitutional standpoint
and from the standpoint of what Rule 23 requires. Despite the Court's due pro-
cess concerns, however, its decision was based on the language of Rule 23.
108. A proposed amendment to Rule 23 would make notice mandatory in all class ac-
tions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (Class Action Subcomm., Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules, Proposed Rule 2001).
109. Many commentators have criticized the effectiveness of notices currently em-
ployed in federal class litigation. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Fu-
ture of Class Actions, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 923, 943 (1998); George Rutherglen, Better
Late than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 267-68 (1996) (asserting that notice is much less effective as a
practical matter when notice is, customarily, sent early on in the proceedings to
class members before they understand the value of their claims and the adequacy
of their representation); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule
23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 134 (1996) (argu-
ing that notices are ineffective generally because they are too technical for the lay
reader to comprehend). However, neither the sufficiency of actual notice content
nor the rate at which notice spurs absent class members to intervene, object, or
make collateral attacks is my concern.
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reading and understanding the notice and then taking action (such as
objecting to the adequacy of representation) often overpower in prac-
tice the theory that underlies at least some class notices. It is impor-
tant, however, to take close account of the various roles that notice
plays under Rule 23. First, the mandatory notice applicable in Rule
23(b)(3) actions, of course, allows the absentee to opt-out and advises
the absentee of her right to enter an appearance. 110 Second, in the
event of a proposed settlement, mandatory notice under Rule 23(e)
permits the absentees to be heard as to the fairness and adequacy of
the settlement terms. Third, discretionary notice under Rule 23(d)(2)
may have a variety of practical and managerial purposes, such as al-
lowing the court to gather additional information regarding the size,
strength, and cohesion of the class claims. Taken together, the vari-
ous notice provisions of Rule 23 not only promote sound judicial ad-
ministration, but also respond to constitutional concerns.
In representative suits, notice performs at least some functions
that differ from notice in traditional adversarial suits. In a perfectly
cohesive class action, with vigorous representation throughout, notice
to the representative would be the equivalent of notice to the class.
But, as a practical matter, such cohesion seldom exists. Generally
speaking, in class suits the constitutional requirement of notice is in-
versely related to the cohesiveness of the class.111 As previously re-
marked, classes certified under 23(b)(3) are typically the least
cohesive; thus, the drafters of Rule 23 provided mandatory notice to
(b)(3) absentees. Although Rule 23 does not expressly state that the
remedy sought is invariably the proxy for determining which provi-
sions of the Rule govern certification, most courts consider the remedy
demanded as the determinant of whether a class may be certified
under one of the "mandatory" subsections or, alternatively, under sub-
section (b)(3) with its option for exclusion. 112 It is of course possible
that a highly cohesive (b)(3) class could be formed. Class members
might be so closely knit that the court would have little concern that
110. In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each mem-
ber that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the mem-
ber so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable
or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires,
enter an appearance through counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
111. This inverse relationship makes sense if notice is viewed as a primary means of
ensuring adequacy of representation.
112. See Robert L. Serenka, Jr., Annotation, Propriety of Allowing Class Member To
Opt Out in Class Action Certified Under Subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2) of Rule 23 of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 A.L.R. FED. 563, §§ 2, 3 (1998).
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the interests of the entire membership were adequately represented,
assuming the class representative vigorously prosecuted the class
claims. Notice would not be constitutionally demanded in such a suit,
even though Rule 23 requires notice and an opportunity to leave the
class. Nonetheless, such cases are likely to be rare, and the use of a
remedial distinction to sort mandatory from non-mandatory classes,
though imperfect, appears to work fairly well in practice.
Classes certified under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), which typi-
cally are closely knit, are (except for settlement) subject only to discre-
tionary notice as specified by the court. 1 13 These discretionary notices
will seldom be required by due process, since most (b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes are sufficiently cohesive to meet constitutional require-
ments.114 Nonetheless, notice can be a useful managerial tool. Of
course, when the class plaintiffs seek not only equitable relief, but
damages as well, class cohesion becomes more problematic, at least
with respect to damages. A uniform damage award across all class
members is often inappropriate, and, to the extent damages are indi-
vidualized, class cohesion suffers proportionately. In general, how-
ever, Rule 23 and its state counterparts satisfy the constitutional
standard of notice because class actions in which damage awards
predominate should be certified under subsection (b)(3). Notice is
mandatory in all (b)(3) classes and, of course, unnamed (b)(3) class
members can take protective action by excluding themselves.
As previously observed, Rule 23 mandates notice in all class action
settlements.115 Although seldom discussed by either courts or com-
mentators, notice may be constitutionally required when a settlement
is tendered because the risk that the adversarial force of the relation-
ship between the named party and the opposing party has weakened
or collapsed during settlement negotiations. Of equal importance is
the fact that there is a high probability of divergent views within the
class on the central issue of whether the settlement is fair and ade-
quate. Whatever cohesion may have existed when claims (or defenses)
were pushed forward in an adversarial context may be weakened or
shattered during the more conciliatory dynamics of settlement. Set-
tlement is necessarily an accommodative step-an agreement is
formed between the class representative and her adversary in which
counsel on both sides take a leading role. But in class actions, counsel
is not subject to the same client control as is counsel in individual
suits: the "client" to which class counsel is accountable is usually
amorphous and widespread. Counsels' fees, seldom discussed openly
during negotiations, often drive the concessions that lead to settle-
113. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2); sources cited supra note 109.
114. Discretionary notice, however, may provide the court a way to monitor the con-
tinuity of adequate representation. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
115. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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ment. Moreover, there are indications that class settlements are in-
creasingly suspect because of possible collusion between plaintiff and
defense counsel. 1 16 Notice and an opportunity to be heard are proba-
bly constitutionally required in the context of settlement agreements
offered for court approval precisely because class cohesion has weak-
ened and adequacy of representation has become fragile and uncer-
tain. In any event, neither judges nor commentators have given
sufficient attention to the degree to which the representative adver-
sarial model is likely to be weakened in the class action settlement
context. During settlement, the cohesion that is so often identified
with each party to a winner-takes-the-spoils conflict begins to frag-
ment and dissolve.
It should be noted that both mandatory and discretionary notice
may have important aims in addition to alleviating concerns about the
constitutional rights of absentee class members. For example, notice
may serve to inform the court of the degree of class cohesion, the desir-
ability of creating subclasses, the fairness of a proposed settlement, or
the appropriateness of certifying specific claims or issues. Although
these matters are potentially of constitutional dimension, they are
also components of Rule 23. Thus, notice may have value not only to
absentees, but also to courts in that responses to interim notice provi-
sions help illuminate managerial decisions by the presiding judge.1 1 7
116. See generally Koniak & Cohen, supra note 74; see also Coffee, supra note 74, at
1373; Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation (pt. 4), 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1806, 1811 (2000); Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Liti-
gation: Who May Challenge Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?,
66 TENN. L REV. 81, 123-24 (1998). Note that the Advisory Committee's Class
Action Subcommittee has recently proposed changes to Rule 23(e) that are aimed
to strengthen judicial review of class action settlements and take into account
collusion concerns. In particular, the Subcommittee focuses on the relative con-
trol of class members versus class counsel of the settlement process. The notes to
Proposed Rule 23(e)(1)(C) suggest that factors to be considered include:
the extent of participation in the settlement negotiations by class mem-
bers or class representatives, a judge, a magistrate judge, or a special
master; the number and force of objections by class members; ... [and]
the reasonableness of any provisions for attorney fees, including agree-
ments with respect to the division of fees among attorneys and the terms
of any agreements affecting the fees to be charged for representing indi-
vidual claimants or objector ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (Class Action Subcomm., Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules,
Proposed Rule 2001).
117. In fact, several sources have suggested that notice is meant to provoke attention
to the vigor of representation in a class suit. The Advisory Committee's notes
state that notice "permits members of the class to object to representation." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note; see also Leslie W. O'Leary, Mass Tort
Class Actions: Will Amchem Spawn Creative Solutions?, 65 DEF. COUNSEL J. 469,
477 (1998) (asserting that that the rulemakers intended for mandatory notice in
(b)(3) actions to provide a way of ensuring adequate representation in addition to
an opportunity to opt out of the suit altogether). Patrick Woolley, in Rethinking
the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 571, 583 (1997),
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4. The Role of Opting Out
Professor John Coffee has cogently pointed out the available means
of protecting unnamed class members: voice (participation in the class
action), loyalty (effective representation by named parties), and exit
(electing to leave the class).118 Opting out, coupled with mandatory
notice, is an important measure to protect absent class members in
actions that are unlikely to be highly cohesive. This procedure for ex-
clusion is, of course, a mandatory feature of class certifications under
Rule 23(b)(3). Specifically, Rule 23(c)(2) requires notice to unnamed
members of a (b)(3) class, informing them of their opportunity to exit
the class. Those who decline to do so are bound by a judgment for or
against the class. 1 19
It is important to analyze closely the role played by the notice and
opt-out provision of Rule 23(c)(2) and its state counterparts. In Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,120 the Supreme Court suggested that
this provision secured personal jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiff
class members who failed to exclude themselves from the class action.
In short, those who chose to remain in the class consented to personaljurisdiction.21 It is difficult, however, to accept the proposition that a
court can confer upon itself jurisdiction over absentees simply by di-
recting a notice that, if unanswered, yields jurisdictional power.1 22 In
ordinary litigation, there is no instance in which a defendant is
brought within a court's personal jurisdiction by the simple failure to
respond to a summons or other document from the court. Such a rule
would very likely be unconstitutional. Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, for example, allows waiver of the formal service of
process, but it still requires the recipient to make affirmative contact
with the court to extend the court's jurisdiction over the non-resi-
notes, however, that notice the Mullane opinion describes as "reasonably calcu-
lated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties" is not necessarily
notice that ensures adequate representation, or else the court would have called
it "notice reasonably calculated to assure adequate representation." Thus, Pro-
fessor Woolley argues, notice has an independent value in the due process matrix.
Nonetheless, it is plausible that the notice described in Mullane does help assure
adequate representation, since apprising interested parties and their representa-
tives in the litigation is the only way to give them an opportunity to object to their
posture through opting out or intervention.
118. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loy-
alty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,
547 (1974); 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 4455.
120. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
121. See id. at 812-13.
122. See Wood, supra note 16, at 620-2 1. Of course, an opt-in provision could serve as
an instrument of jurisdiction by consent. But in a properly certified class, per-
sonal jurisdiction over the class representative suffices.
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dent.123 The Advisory Committee in fact explicitly rejected the idea
that a court could extend personal jurisdiction over a non-resident de-
fendant merely through his failure to respond to mailed service. 124
While it is true that personal jurisdiction can, for example, be ac-
quired through a consent transmitted by mail, the defendant must af-
firmatively register her submission to this territorial jurisdiction.125
Realistically, the notice and exclusionary provisions of Rule 23 op-
erate to secure, by declination, the consent of unnamed class members
to be represented by the named member(s) of the class. The issue of
personal jurisdiction should turn not upon notice, but rather upon the
relationship between the claims (or defenses) and factual postures of
the class representative(s), on the one hand, and those of the unnamed
members of the class, on the other. Note, also, that the consent given
by inaction is a consent to be adequately represented as to the claims
or defenses enumerated in the notice, which explains why a Rule
23(b)(3) absentee who does not opt out can still challenge, in a subse-
quent proceeding (or by intervention), the sufficiency of her represen-
tation in the class suit.
The drafters of Rule 23 very likely intended to coordinate the de-
gree of class cohesion with the right of (b)(3) exclusion. Further, the
drafters probably thought that the right to be excluded under subsec-
tion (b)(3) was nothing more than a right to withdraw from class rep-
resentation. The Advisory Committee's notes suggest these premises,
although the focus of the Committee is on individual interests. The
note to subdivision (c)(2), the mandatory opt-out section applying to
(b)(3) classes, states that
the interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigations may be so
strong here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether. Even when a
class action is maintained under subdivsion (b)(3), this individual interest is
respected. Thus the court is required to direct notice to the members of the
class of the right of each member to be excluded from the class upon his
request. 126
Not only does the opt-out provision help to compensate for the lack of
cohesion typical of (b)(3) classes, it also, at least in theory, helps com-
bat the increased risk, inherent in many (b)(3) actions, of inadequate
representation. Such potential inadequacy results from both the in-
creased probability of diverse claims and defenses and the heightened
123. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee changed
the language describing waiver of formal process, no longer referring to waiver as
service-by-mail" because "[tihis language misled some plaintiffs into thinking
that service could be effected by mail without the affirmative cooperation of the
defendant. It is more accurate to describe the communication sent to the defen-
dant as a request for a waiver of formal service." Id. (citation omitted).
125. See Schultz v. Schultz, 436 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1971), for a sample of cases raising
the issue of whether defendants' actions amounted to an actual consent.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
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risk that the (b)(3) representatives may not have large individual
claims, thus increasing the probability that they will lack an adequate
incentive to monitor class counsel. That these concerns underlie the
exclusionary provisions seems much more likely than the dubious as-
sertion that the passive "consent" of absent class members yields per-
sonal jurisdiction.
In theory, and occasionally in practice, a class action certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) is highly cohesive, rendering mandatory opt out
constitutionally superfluous.127 But, as noted earlier, the drafters of
Rule 23 necessarily had to deal with practical generalities, and the
application of a mandatory opt-out provision to all (b)(3) classes is a
workable, if imprecise, solution.12s While it is tempting to criticize
the opt-out right as ineffective because relatively few absentees elect
to withdraw from the class suit,129 the frequent declination of this op-
tion is not necessarily an indication that the procedure is somehow
constitutionally flawed. Although there are no hard data, it is quite
plausible that a significant portion of those who decline to opt out
choose this course of action because they have no intention of filing an
individual suit. Thus, they have little or nothing to lose by remaining
in a plaintiff class.
D. Challenging the Adequacy of Representation
The ultimate judicial corrective, fundamental to the representative
model, is the provision for a challenge to the adequacy of representa-
tion by the class representative(s)-in practical terms the named class
members and class counsel. Although an unnamed class member is
entitled to appear before the court in a pending class action and con-
test the adequacy of representation, this intervention is not often fea-
sible since it is likely to be costly, inconvenient, and time consuming.
Furthermore, defects in the quality of representation may not be ap-
parent to unnamed members of the class until the trial is in its latter
stages or completed. Thus, for most absentees, a formal challenge af-
ter a final judgment is the only corrective to an unwarranted adverse
class judgment. Some commentators have leveled sharp criticism at
this restricted opportunity, noting that this ex post challenge, like in-
tervention, faces formidable obstacles of timing and a heightened
127. See supra text accompanying notes 77 & 78.
128. According to Professor Newberg, "The Rules Advisory Committee's adoption of
the opt out clause ... showed its concern with the individual interests intrinsic to
Rule 23(b)(3) class suits .... ." 3 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 19, § 16.15.
129. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FED-




standard of review. 130 Challenging adequacy is also likely to be bur-
densome and expensive, and the amount of the judgment against an
individual class member may not justify the contest. Nevertheless,
the basic constitutional principle has been to permit unnamed class
members to challenge the adequacy of their representation in a collat-
eral trial. If the court finds that the class (or certain members within
it) was inadequately represented, the judgment as to the class (or indi-
vidual within it) will be invalidated under the Due Process Clause. 131
The fact that absent class members are permitted a post-judgment at-
tack on the outcome of a suit attests powerfully to the fact that ade-
quacy of representation is a fundamental principle of class actions.1 32
Hansberry v. Lee, noted earlier, 133 is a compelling example of inad-
equate representation occasioned by conflicting interests within the
class. There, certain landowners, purporting to represent an entire
class of neighborhood residents, sued in Illinois state court to enforce a
racially restrictive covenant. Upholding the covenant, the court is-
sued a decree, the validity of which became important in a subsequent
suit to enforce the restrictive covenant against the Hansberrys. In the
latter suit, the Hansberrys argued that the earlier suit sustaining the
validity of the covenant had no preclusive effect on them.134 The
United States Supreme Court agreed, noting that
[b]ecause of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of those who are pu-
tative parties to the agreement in compelling or resisting its performance, it is
impossible to say, solely because they are parties to it, that any two of them
are of the same class. Nor without more, and with due regard for the protec-
tion of the rights of absent parties which due process exacts, can some be per-
mitted to stand in judgment for all. 13 5
Hansberry thus supports the principle that a post-judgment attack on
the adequacy of representation, even if not ideal, is a constitutionally
mandated means of securing the due process rights of class absentees.
It further stands for the proposition that a significant divergence of
130. See Downs, supra note 1, at 707-08; Koniak & Cohen, supra note 74, at 1117
n.213.
131. Professor Woolley asserts that adequacy of representation and due process are
not equivalent. See Woolley, supra note 117, at 572. Professor Woolley argues
that a class member, to have full access to due process, must be able to intervene
in the suit and secure his individual day in court if he so wishes. See id. at 573.
132. Finality, or res judicata, is such an important guiding principle of our legal sys-
tem that its disruption is a powerful statement. In Tice v. American Airlines,
Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit noted that the virtual
representation doctrine, which stands at the outer reaches of representative liti-
gation, highlights the tension between "the right ... of each individual to assert
her own claim; and the need of litigants and the judicial system alike for finality
of decision after a full and fair airing of a matter."
133. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
134. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
135. Id. at 44.
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interest among class members or between class members and the
class representatives necessarily thwarts adequate representation.
While some commentators have described adequacy of representa-
tion in terms of procedural due process and even notions of "participa-
tion values,"136 courts have identified various concrete, practical
factors that are essential features of adequate representation. These
include, for example, vigorous prosecution by the named parties and
class counsel, minimum knowledge of the case (by class representa-
tives), 137 ability to finance the suit, competency of class counsel, and,
of course, an absence of conflicts of interest.13s It seems plain enough
that representation will be insufficient if there is a significant diver-
gence between the legal and factual postures of the representatives
and those of the class or some members within it. Concerns about
adequacy of representation are more pressing in the class context
than in traditional representative suits, where typically there is a pre-
existing relationship between the representative and the represented,
the number of persons represented is comparatively small, the per-
sons represented are usually well informed about the litigation, and
the representative is not asserting his own claims.139 At the core of
adequacy of representation in the class context, however, are three
principal features: sufficient cohesion between representative and the
entire class (or subclass), competency of class counsel, and continuous
vigor in the prosecution (or defense) of the suit. If any of these essen-
tial components is absent as to one or more unnamed class members,
the resulting judgment is constitutionally defective and should not
bind them.
E. Binding Absent Defendant Class Members
The conditions under which absent defendant class members can
be bound has proven to be a controversial and vexing question. 140 In-
136. See Woolley, supra note 117, at 596-97.
137. See Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981); Epifano v. Boardroom Bus.
Prods., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Amswiss Int'l Corp. v. Heu-
blein, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 663 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
138. See ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY LITIGATION
§§ 3.23, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.27, 3.29 (1999).
139. To understand how adequacy of representation is of special concern in the class
action context, consider the unusual situation in which a pro se litigant seeks to
represent a class. In Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975), the
Fourth Circuit found that a pro se litigant, because he is a layman, cannot ade-
quately represent a class of prisoners in a (b)(2) action, thus putting their rights
at stake. The class action context clearly requires special protections to maintain
the representational model which separate it from other kinds of litigation. See
supra section III.A.
140. Other commentators have broached this issue, expressing a great deal of concern.




tuitively, the idea of binding absent class defendants is disquieting,
first, because procedural law treats plaintiffs and defendants differ-
ently141 and, second, because the incentive structure of class actions
could topple in a defendant class. An example of the latter difficulty is
the oft-cited problem of the reluctant defendant class representative
named against her wishes to defend the class.14 2 There is also, at
least in theory, the problem of the unnamed class member who learns,
only after trial, that she has suffered an adverse judgment. Nonethe-
less, using the representative model as the appropriate framework
brings defendant class actions into clearer perspective. The question
to be asked is whether the dictates of Rule 23 will adequately protect
the members of the defendant class so as to produce a binding
judgment.
It is important to note, first, that Rule 23, which embraces the rep-
resentative model, also explicitly contemplates defendant class ac-
tions. Both section (a), which outlines the prerequisites of any class
suit,143 and subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3) feature language indicating
that the drafters envisioned maintenance of defendant class ac-
tions.144 Because categories (b)(1) and (b)(3)-but not (b)(2)-contain
explicit references to making a defense to claims against the class, a
debate has arisen among commentators and within the courts as to
141. For example, the most basic framework of the civil suit is that the plaintiff has
the burden of proof rather than the defendant, except when the defendant is in
the plaintiffs posture when offering a counterclaim or an "affirmative" defense.
142. Professor Elizabeth Brandt remarks that a defendant's "unwillingness to serve in
a representational capacity" may well threaten the adequacy of representation of
absent defendant class members, since they would be unlikely to engage in a vig-
orous defense. Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a
Defendant Class: A Proposed Revision of Rule 23, 1990 BYU L. REV. 909, 921. At
the same time, however, a willing defendant representative may also be suspect,
because willingness to defend may indicate collusion with the plaintiff, who
selects the defendant representative herself. See id.; see also Debra J. Gross,
Comment, Mandatory Notice and Defendant Class Actions: Resolving the Para-
dox of Identity Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 EMORY L.J. 611, 624 (1991);
Robert E. Holo, Comment, Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule 23 and a
Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 223, 232-33 (1990).
143. Rule 23(a) states that "one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if [four prerequisites are certified]."
(emphasis added).
144. Rule 23(b)(1) allows for class treatment if "the prosecution of separate actions by
or against individual members of the class" would cause inconsistent standards of
behavior or deplete a limited fund the entire class is entitled to. (emphasis ad-
ded). Rule 23(b)(3)(A) offers that one important factor courts should consider in
their certification decisions include "the interest of members of the class in indi-




whether Rule 23(b)(2) permits defendant class actions.145 That the
allowance of defendant class actions was not a subject of pointed de-
bate among the drafters of (b)(2) or any other Rule 23 provision, how-
ever, may well reflect the uniform historical acceptance of defendant
class actions. Not only were defendant class actions common in early
English group litigation,146 but they were also some of the earliest
notable American class actions.147 At any rate, it is not surprising
that Rule 23 seems broadly to contemplate defendant classes.
An important feature of Rule 23's inclusion of the defendant class
action is its apparent indifference to whether a particular class is
made up of plaintiffs or defendants: its provisions apply to any class,
regardless of its litigating posture. As noted earlier, in light of the
differences between plaintiffs and defendants usually found in proce-
dural rules, such symmetry seems, at first blush, to be misplaced. In
practice, however, defendant class actions should rarely pose a special
concern, particularly if courts acknowledge and respect the represen-
tative model. Indeed, very few defendant class actions are filed under
any category, and even fewer are certified.148 Certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) is understandably rare, 14 9 since the mandatory opt-out
provision would shatter maintenance of the class. Few plaintiffs
would seek certification under (b)(3) only to have most, if not all, de-
fendants leave the class. Thus, certification of defendant classes most
often occurs under (b)(1) or (b)(2), with (b)(2), at least traditionally,
being the most common certification category.15o That said, however,
the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have now construed Rule
23(b)(2) so as to disallow completely the certification of defendant clas-
ses under that subsection.151
145. Professor David H. Taylor describes the terms of the debate in Defendant Class
Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2): Resolving the Language Dilemma, 40 U. KAN. L.
REV. 77, 85-107 (1991). See also id. at 81 n.17, 83 & n.19.
146. Professor Hazard notes that unincorporated associations found themselves in ei-
ther procedural posture in eighteenth century English group litigation. Hazard
et al., supra note 26, at 1874.
147. See, e.g., Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853); Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265
(1883).
148. See Comment; Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33
UCLA L. REV. 283, 288, 296-317 (1985).
149. For an example of (b)(3) defendant class certification, see Appleton Electric Co. v.
Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1980), which involved a defendant
class of common carriers that had overcharged its customers in violation of fed-
eral regulations. As to the applicability of the language of amended Rule 23, see
supra note 144.
150. See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 19, § 4.64 (noting that (b)(2) defendant clas-
ses often involve claims against public officials and other "semiautonomous" pub-
lic bodies, such as local courts).
151. See Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414-17 (7th Cir. 1987); Thomp-
son v. Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1983); Paxman v. Campbell,
612 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980).
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Defendant classes are so rare that despite the due process concerns
they pose in theory, these suits seldom occupy the forefront of consti-
tutional difficulties.152 The Supreme Court has encountered only
eight defendant class actions certified under amended Rule 23,153 and
the various courts of appeals have entertained only a negligible num-
ber compared to the far greater number of plaintiff class actions.
Even if Rule 23's plaintiff-defendant symmetry might in theory permit
the unconstitutional certification of a defendant class, it is unlikely
that a "properly certified" class (under Rule 23) will be unconstitu-
tional. Perhaps the remoteness of this possibility helps explain why
the Supreme Court, in its few cases involving defendant classes, has
merely acquiesced in the existence of a defendant class as long as the
prerequisites of Rule 23 are satisfied.
In Bazemore v. Friday,154 for example, the Fourth Circuit had re-
fused to certify a class of defendant North Carolina counties accused of
race discrimination in the administration of local agricultural exten-
sion services and 4-H clubs. 155 The court found that no "standardized
practice" existed by virtue of a statewide rule, and thus plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B).156 The Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling, but neither explicitly endorsed nor ques-
tioned the constitutionality of defendant class actions. In fact (and not
surprisingly), no facial constitutional challenge to Rule 23's allowance
of defendant class actions has reached the Court and, more impor-
tantly, neither has a contextual challenge to a lower court's certifica-
tion of a defendant class under Rule 23(b)(2) been successful in the
highest court. Perhaps this paucity of authority is because most de-
fendant class actions that have come before the Supreme Court and
various courts of appeals have been tightly knit, thus tending to re-
strict or foreclose serious due process concerns, at least where the vig-
orousness of representation was carefully monitored by the trial
judge. In one case, a class of public officials was alleged to have acted
in their official capacity so as to contribute to the same injury against
a class of plaintiffs. The certification of the defendant class was ap-
proved under Rule 23(b)(2).157 It will thus be seen why one common
152. See Note, supra note 140, at 638-50 (discussing fairness concerns regarding both
absent defendant class members as well as defendant class representatives).
153. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54
(1986); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Sec'y
of Pub. Welfare v. Inst. Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975); Gonzalez v. Automatic Employer Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90
(1974).
154. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
155. See id. at 389, 392-93.
156. See id. at 406.
157. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (acquiescing to a defendant class of
county clerks from Wisconsin by affirming a district court ruling against them).
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form of the defendant class action is exemplified by the so-called "pris-
oner's suit," wherein a single prisoner or class of prisoners typically
challenge the constitutionality of correctional facility policies by nam-
ing as class defendants the officers who implement these policies.158
Because correctional officers usually implement common policies, a
plaintiff prisoner seeking injunctive relief can often maintain his suit
as a class action. Similarly, citizens of a particular state sometimes
lodge statutory challenges against state officials and obtain a defen-
dant class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A).159
Typical suits against public officials differ significantly from the
factual and legal pattern in La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co. 16o
There, the Ninth Circuit consolidated on appeal two similar actions
involving consumer rights and unfair, industry-wide practices.161
One of the lower courts framed the problem in La Mar as that of the
standing of the named class plaintiffs to sue the defendant class on
behalf of all plaintiffs when each named plaintiff was allegedly injured
by only one of the named defendants in each suit.162 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, concentrated on the prerequisites of Rule 23 and deter-
mined that the structure of these two class actions did not fulfill the
standards of typicality of representation. In the court's view, it was
decisive that many members of the class had no claim against the de-
fendant(s) singled out by their class representative for the assertion of
her claim.163
One should not conclude, however, that a faithful application of the
prerequisites of Rule 23 renders the defendant class action extraordi-
In fact, it is generally accepted that a suit for injunctive relief is maintainable
against a class of local public officials when the plaintiff seeks to invalidate a
statute on its face or seeks to change a statewide administrative policy. See 6A
FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 12:205 (Russell J. Davis & Wayne F. Foster eds., Lawyers
ed. 1989); 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 19, § 4.65; see also Monaco v. Stone,
187 F.R.D. 50, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
158. See, e.g, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093(8th Cir. 1990); Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979); Rakes v. Cole-
man, 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970).
159. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ga. 1988); CBS, Inc.
v. Smith, 681 F. Supp 794 (S.D. Fla. 1988). On the other hand, unrelated pat-
terns of discrimination would dilute the cohesion necessary for a defendant class.
See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
160. 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir 1973).
161. See id. at 462-63.
162. See id. at 463.
163. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Obviously [the typicality] requirement is not met when the 'representa-
tive' plaintiff never had a claim of any type against any defendant ....
We believe that this prerequisite is also lacking when the plaintiffs
cause of action, although similar to that of other members of the class, is





nary, or that the existence of a defendant class action alters the appli-
cation of Rule 23. In La Mar, for example, the court of appeals simply
upheld the intent of the drafters concerning the prerequisites of a
proper class after two district courts within the circuit had disputed
whether there ought to be an "exception" to Rule 23's requirement
that each defendant be causally linked to each class member's in-
jury.164 Although the named plaintiffs in La Mar were eager to prose-
cute on behalf of all class members, most of the unnamed members did
not have "typical" claims against the members of the defendant
class. 16 5
If courts are careful to ensure a great measure of cohesion in defen-
dant class actions, the "Shutts dilemma" of personal jurisdiction
should not arise even though some members of the defendant class
have no significant contacts with the forum state. Again, experience
and practicality tend to overshadow theoretical difficulties: it is rare
that a case will arise in which unnamed defendant class members will
be able to demonstrate that they do not have an adequate affiliation
with the forum state. As noted, many defendant class certifications
involve public officials-all of whom have minimum contacts with or
presence within the forum state.1 6 6 Nonetheless, it is important to
ask the question whether a (b)(1) or (b)(2) suit could be properly certi-
fied if the defendant class contained out-of-state defendants over
whom the court had no direct in personam jurisdiction. After all, the
Shutts court pointedly remarked on the significant difference between
plaintiffs and defendants when considering issues of personal jurisdic-
tion. 167 Does this distinction mean that there is a sharp difference
between plaintiff classes and defendant classes insofar as the effect of
a judgment or decree on unnamed parties is concerned?
There would appear to be a practical difference between plaintiff
and defendant classes if a judgment involves a damage award. The
certification of a plaintiff class puts at risk each plaintiffs loss of a
potential asset-realization of her claim. The certification of a defen-
dant class puts at risk an immediate monetary loss for each individual
in the class, thus (potentially) negatively altering her current finan-
164. See id. at 465-66.
165. See id.
166. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. Many defendant class actions of
other types, in fact, have absentee defendants that already satisfy the minimum
contacts requirements. See Holo, supra note 142, at 245 n.92.
167. The Shutts Court stated, 'Jnlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent
class-action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow
the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards pro-




cial status.168 In utilitarian terms, it is more disruptive to lose $1000
from one's current assets than it is to fail to realize a $1000 gain that
is inchoate and problematic. Perhaps the Shutts Court was concerned
about highlighting the differences between plaintiffs and defendants
in (b)(3) actions because these actions are predominantly for money
damages. Of course, Rule 23 diminishes many constitutional concerns
in (b)(3) damage suits by providing for individual notice and an oppor-
tunity to opt out. Thus, under a proper application of Rule 23 the
Shutts dilemma as applied to class defendants shrinks in importance.
This follows from the fact that (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, which seek
predominately or exclusively equitable relief, differ in important re-
spects from class actions certified under (b)(3).169 As previously
noted, (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes tend to be tightly knit, comparatively
cohesive classes. Further, the relief granted typically compels mem-
bers of a defendant class to conduct themselves in a lawful manner.
At least, in cases where damages for past wrongdoing are not as-
serted, the equitable nature of (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions mollifies some
of the due process concerns underlying defendant class actions. Of
course, where damage claims predominate, certification must occur, if
at all, under subsection (b)(3) with the accompanying option to leave
the class.
There remains, however, the possibility of a suit against a defen-
dant class that seeks predominately equitable relief, but also asserts a
claim for damages. Here, the likelihood is strong that individual dif-
ferences among class members would render the certification of a de-
fendant class under either (b)(1) or (b)(2) inappropriate. However, in
the rare case of sufficient class cohesion to enable (b)(1) or (b)(2) certi-
fications, the representative model would dictate a binding "law-eq-
uity" judgment that embraced even those unnamed class members
without a nexus to the forum state.
There is, however, a collateral point to be noted with respect to the
enforcement of an equitable class judgment or decree. The point
arises because of the interface between representative class actions
and traditional restrictions in judicial power. Unless the named de-
fendants, by virtue of their position or office, have directive authority
168. Of course, one's interest in a judgment is considered a "property interest" in the
law of federal procedural due process, see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 429-30 (1982) (discussing the property interest civil litigants have tra-
ditionally had in adjudicatory proceedings), but the difference between a class
plaintiff and class defendant is one of degree, not that one has a property interest
in the outcome of a lawsuit while the other does not.
169. Due process concerns surrounding equitable and legal relief differ substantially
because equity allows courts to modify the terms of relief as circumstances
change over time after entry of the judgment. This inherent flexibility may ease
due process concerns, whereas relief in the form of damages consists of an imme-
diate, unalterable, out-of-pocket loss to the defendant.
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over the unnamed class members, it will be necessary to seek enforce-
ment of the judgment or decree in a court that has personal jurisdic-
tion over recalcitrant unnamed class members. The properly entered
class judgment is binding on the absentee class member in the sense
that she is subject to claim and issue preclusion, but, since equity
"acts directly on the person," it seems clear that the enforcing court
must have direct judicial authority over the person of unnamed (ab-
sent) defendants. Under traditional jurisdictional principles, and in
the absence of a federal statute granting "nationwide" service of pro-
cess, a forum court's ability to enter a direct order against unnamed
class members (on pain of contempt) would not exist in the absence of
affiliating contacts with the forum state. This position has received
support from at least one federal court of appeals.17
0
Note, finally, that a valid damage judgment against an absentee
class defendant should be enforceable in any jurisdiction in which she
has assets. An absent defendant class member's claim that in per-
sonam jurisdiction was lacking in the initial action should be rejected
on the ground that in a properly conducted class suit, personal juris-
diction over the class representative is the sole requirement for a bind-
ing judgment. On the other hand, as discussed below, the absentee
should be able to advance a claim that she was inadequately repre-
sented, and, if that claim prevails, escape the binding effect of the
class judgment.
IV. THE REPRESENTATIVE MODEL APPLIED TO
OVERLAPPING ACTIONS AND CHALLENGES
TO JUDGMENT
A. Anti-Suit Injunctions
Anti-suit injunctions barring nonforum claims by absent, unnamed
class members pose a significant problem with the rise of nationwide
class actions. 17 1 The issuance of anti-suit injunctions may cure some
of the systemic problems of the class action. For example, the "race to
judgment" or, in the settlement context, the "reverse auction" occurs
when overlapping class actions, derived from the same transaction,
are filed in different forums, and various class counsel compete to be
the first to obtain a preclusive judgment or settlement, thus securing
lucrative attorneys fees.' 7 2 Anti-suit injunctions may prevent other
problems, such as that of late-arriving class counsel who file in a dif-
ferent forum from the original class action (hoping to share in the fees
of the first suit), and of the "migratory settler," who shops different
170. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998).
171. See generally Monaghan, supra note 1; Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Ac-
tions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 511-19 (2000).
172. See Coffee, supra note 70, at 370-73.
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forums in search of a friendly court willing to certify an inadequate or
unfair settlement.173 If these various problems are neglected, the out-
comes of many class actions are likely to be unsatisfactory-at least
the result for individual class members will probably be less valuable
than one obtained through an individual suit. In short, unless there is
some means of controlling self-seeking activity that can frustrate the
proper prosecution of a class action suit, the final result is likely to be
distorted, thus frustrating both the class membership and the
judiciary.
Nonetheless, broad anti-suit injunctions have the potential to vio-
late the due process rights of absent class members.174 The essence of
an anti-suit injunction order is a direct judicial command intended to
control individual behavior-that of one or more class members.
Thus, to issue an effective anti-suit injunction against class action ab-
sentees, the court must have personal jurisdiction over them. The or-
der from the court would be a personal directive requiring some basis
of territorial power. If there is no basis for personal jurisdiction, such
as contacts in the forum state, presence, or a federal statute or state
rule of court, a judicial order should be ineffective as against absent
class members-unless, of course, named class members have direc-
tive authority over absentees.
A second and equally serious problem arises when the class court
("Fl"), using either an injunctive order or the doctrine of preclusion,
purports to block challenges to the adequacy of representation that
are lodged in a second forum ("F2"). Although a named class member
represents the absentees regarding their claims in the class action fo-
rum, she does not represent the absentees with respect to claims that
challenge the adequacy of representation in the class court. This prin-
ciple, which expresses a fundamental limit on representative class ac-
tions, is more fully elaborated below.
B. Collateral Attack and the Extension of Personal
Jurisdiction in the Class Context
Professor Henry Paul Monaghan has persuasively argued that the
Shutts Court's use of an "implied consent rationale" as a vehicle of
conferring personal jurisdiction over absentees who fail to opt out is
173. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1183. Professor Monaghan states that Carlough
v. Amchem Products, Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993), provides a perfect example
of the late-arriving attorney seeking to earn fees through extortion, while the
leading case of In re General Motors Corp., 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1993), exempli-
fies the "migratory settler" problem. See also Wasserman, supra note 171, at 486-
87 (referring to the "migratory settler" problem as the "'repackaged' class
action").
174. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (1996);
Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1149-55; Wasserman, supra note 171, at 494-95.
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misleading. 175 This fictional "consent" does no more than bind prop-
erly represented class plaintiffs to claim and issue preclusion relevant
to their claims and defenses. Monaghan demonstrates that using the
Shutts version of consent as a basis for enjoining suits in other juris-
dictions poised to make a collateral attack upon the adequacy of repre-
sentation in the class forum contradicts modern understandings of
class actions, personal jurisdiction, and due process. 176 These views
underscore how the dictum in Shutts can lead to basic doctrinal
flaws.177
As noted earlier, opting out of (or remaining in) a class suit should
not be characterized as an election regarding the forum court's juris-
diction, but rather should be viewed as withdrawing from (or remain-
ing within) representation by the named class member(s). As
previously stated, when there is sufficient cohesion within a class, the
representative model does not require personal jurisdiction over ab-
sentees. In a (b)(3) class suit, which is often composed of loosely knit
members, failure to opt out is not a consent to jurisdiction, but rather
is an acquiescence to the representative character of the suit or, put
otherwise, consent to be represented with respect to the claims and
defenses asserted on behalf of the class. It follows, then, that when
adequacy is challenged in F2, it is not enough for a court to say that
failure to opt out binds an absent class member to the "jurisdiction" of
Fl. A challenge to adequacy rejects the sufficiency of the class repre-
sentation, not the lack of judicial power when representation is ade-
quate. An absent class member is always entitled to adequate
representation, and it is irrelevant whether she is a member of the
class through her failure to opt out or because she had no option to
leave the class. Generally speaking, neither an injunction nor preclu-
sion by judgment should be used to deny to an absent class member
the right to challenge the adequacy of her representation. Moreover, a
denial of this opportunity contravenes Hansberry v. Lee, which estab-
lishes that one can negate a class suit judgment on the ground of inad-
equate representation.1 7 8 Put otherwise, if one is entitled to escape
175. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1178-79.
176. See id. at 1179. Professor Joan Steinman, in The Newest Frontier of Judicial
Activism: Removal Under the All Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773 (2000), also re-
jects the idea that the All Writs Act could be used to enlarge the jurisdiction of
federal courts to sufficiently enlarge personal jurisdiction to prevent collateral
attacks in F2.
177. Professor Monaghan, however, appears to merge the distinctions between per-
sonal jurisdiction and procedural due process. He asserts that failure of personal
jurisdiction is a failure of adequacy of representation, which amounts to a proce-
dural deprivation. See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 1172-73.
178. 311 U.S. 32 (1940); see supra text accompanying notes 131-32. In Hansberry v.
Lee, a clear conflict of interest existed between the representative parties and the
unnamed class members. The Court determined that this conflict made it impos-
sible for the unnamed class members to have their interests fairly represented in
2003] 1047
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the binding effect of a class judgment, it follows that one must have an
adequate opportunity to achieve that escape.
The principle that any absentee class member should be able to
collaterally attack a class judgment based on inadequacy of represen-
tation springs from a fundamental constitutional precept: the Due
Process Clause secures one's right to have her day in court (either in
person or by a suitable representative) before she can be subjected to a
binding judgment.179 A primary feature of collateral attack based on
inadequacy of representation is that, by its nature, it is a claim that
puts the absentee class member in an adversarial posture with respect
to the class representative and class counsel. There is no defensible
logic by which this attack should be foreclosed on the ground that the
named party and class counsel have already represented (and fore-
closed) the class members on this vital question. Typically, the repre-
sentative and class counsel have incentives to defend the adequacy of
their performance, especially when they have negotiated a settlement
with the class opponent. The absentee who challenges the representa-
tive, therefore, should be allowed to have her day in court for the fun-
damental reason that on the issue of representational adequacy she
usually has no adequate spokesman in the class suit. In the case of
absentees outside the in personam jurisdictional reach of F1, the right
to challenge representation includes choosing one's own forum. 180
court, and overturned the judgment. Several scholars, citing preclusion doctrine
as support, suggest that another court should be unable to "relitigate" the ques-
tion of adequacy of representation. See, e.g, Wasserman, supra note 171, at 495
("In certifying the class ... the court in the first class action already will have
found that the representation was adequate. Given that finding, the court in the
later action will have to determine whether the absent class members are barred,
as a matter of issue preclusion, from relitigating the issue of adequacy of repre-
sentation." (internal citations omitted)); Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Mat-
sushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving
Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 219 (suggesting that challenging
adequacy in a collateral attack in another forum instead of raising it directly vio-
lates the principle of finality). In fact, it may be important to uphold a fairly
conducted adversarial finding that representation was adequate after the entire
suit was litigated, but because representation must be continuous, it cannot be
said that the finding of adequacy rendered at the point of certification alone is
enough to preclude another court from taking up the issue.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
180. This is not to say that anti-suit injunctions, in every situation, will violate the
due process rights of absentees. For example, in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998), a federal district court in California had sought to en-
join a state court proceeding in Georgia by a man who purported to opt out of the
federal action on behalf of all Georgia residents in the class. The federal action,
which covered a nationwide class of consumers allegedly harmed by defective
rear door latches on certain Chrysler mini-vans, was a consolidation of several
suits. Id. at 1018. The Georgia "representative" ignored the injunction then is-
sued by the court and filed for certification in Georgia, which was subsequently
granted. Id. The Hanlon court affirmed the right of the federal court to issue the
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Conversely, it should be constitutional for a class court to force
those unnamed members within its personal jurisdiction to channel
their inadequacy claims exclusively to the class forum, assuming, of
course, there is a fair and adequate opportunity to litigate the issue
there. That said, Professor Patrick Woolley makes the telling point
that current procedural "rules and statutes do not require absent class
members" to lodge their adequacy objections "in the class suit itself,"
nor is there current authorization for class courts to force unnamed
members within their jurisdiction to do so.18 1 Beyond this, Professor
Woolley argues persuasively that requiring unnamed members to take
an active role in the class suit in order to protect their interests is
inconsistent with the representative model,' 8 2 which is perhaps why
the rules have no such requirement. Once an absent member is com-
pelled to channel her adequacy objections into the class court, she no
longer retains the privilege of a represented plaintiff who may sit back
and allow the litigation to run its course under the guidance of the
class representative and the class counsel.i 8 3
The general constitutional principle is that without an individual
jurisdictional nexus to the class action forum, an unnamed member
cannot be prevented from litigating, in the forum of her choice, due
process challenges based on inadequate representation. Neither an
injunction nor issue preclusion should block this challenge. It is im-
portant to differentiate issue preclusion as it pertains to the substance
of an action, from issue preclusion that pertains to adequacy of repre-
sentation. While preclusion by judgment generally applies to class ac-
tions, it does so only if the judgment is valid, and a valid judgment
presupposes adequacy of representation throughout the class suit.
The fact that a class is certified does not ordinarily involve a determi-
nation that representation has been adequate throughout the entire
litigation. Certification normally takes place early in the litigation.
Furthermore, even a determination of adequacy that is made at the
conclusion of litigation (whether through settlement or trial) should
not preempt a challenge by unnamed class members: they have not
had their day in court either individually or through an adequate rep-
resentative as to the vital issue of adequacy.' 8 4 The representative
injunction staying the state court proceeding. Id. at 1024. This case is one in
which an injunction is especially appropriate because the Georgia representative
single-handedly sought to represent absent Georgians who were already, by all
accounts, being adequately represented at the federal level.
181. Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representa-
tion in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 394 (2000).
182. Id. at 398-400.
183. See id. at 398.
184. See, e.g., Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir.
1998). In that case, Professor (now Judge) Diane P. Wood noted that due process
violations based on inadequate representation could have been raised in the case
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model fails here because there is a conflict between the representative
and the represented. Perhaps it would be constitutionally permissible
for the class court to adjudicate the adequacy question if the judge
appointed representatives or guardians who have no conflict of inter-
est and who are charged with the duty of showing that representation
was inadequate.18 5 It is not, however, the general practice to make
such appointments.
In short, under existing principles the only way for a class court
properly to gain a monopoly over the issue of adequacy is to have ac-
tual personal jurisdiction over unnamed class members and to issue
an order pursuant to a statute or rule of court that channels adequacy
objections into the class forum. Furthermore, the absentee must be
accorded proper notice and an ample opportunity, often including dis-
covery, to challenge representational adequacy. It would also appear
that the sufficiency of representation must be challenged on an issue-
by-issue basis, since adequacy of representation for one issue or set of
issues (or for one subclass) within the suit does not necessarily mean
adequacy on all issues (and all subclasses).186 If the class court rejects
entirely the challenge to representational adequacy, the only recourse
for the class member who appears in the class suit is to appeal the
ruling of the trial judge.
Consider in this context Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Ep-
stein,18 7 where the Court faced a different problem: the preclusion of
federal litigation by a state court judgment. The Matsushita class liti-
gation began when shareholders of MCA, Inc. filed state law claims
against both MCA and Matsushita following Matsushita's takeover of
MCA.188 The class suit was filed in a Delaware state court.1 8 9
Shortly after suit was lodged, however, other shareholders filed fed-
eral claims against Matsushita in federal court alleging SEC viola-
tions.190 While an appeal of the summary judgment granted to
Matsushita by the federal district judge was pending in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Delaware court approved a class settlement which, in part,
released all state and federal claims against Matsushita stemming
as a means of defeating another forum's anti-suit injunction. See id. at 269, 275.
There is, however, contrary authority. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10
F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993), which is carefully reviewed in Monaghan, supra note 1,
at 1182.
185. See Woolley, supra note 181, at 434 (suggesting that collateral attack be brought
as a class suit itself).
186. Challengers to adequacy of representation do not have a carte blanche choice of
forum, but this is not unusual in civil procedure, either. Note that in other situa-
tions, such as interpleader, a court can assert jurisdiction over a plaintiff against
his will.
187. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).





from the acquisition.19 1 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit refused to al-
low release of the federal claims despite the apparently applicable pro-
visions of the Full Faith and Credit Act.192
The Supreme Court reversed, determined that the Full Faith and
Credit Act was dispositive, and suggested that the reach of judicial
power to control litigation through res judicata in large nationwide
class actions is appropriately broad.19 3 Although the Court carefully
noted the fact that the Delaware trial court issued personal notice to
everyone bound in the class judgment, gave the plaintiffs in the Cali-
fornia federal case an opportunity to opt out, and held a thorough
hearing as to the fairness of the settlement, the Court also carefully
noted that it was not deciding whether unnamed members of the class
could challenge the adequacy of their representation. 194 The settle-
ment at issue in Matsushita released federal claims both to encourage
resolution of the dispute and to prevent repetitive litigation. The Su-
preme Court's affirmance of claim preclusion following the steps taken
by the trial judge may be taken as an endorsement of strong judicial
management in the class context, but it should not be read as approv-
ing the principle that a hearing by the class judge on the issue of ade-
quacy forecloses challenges in F2. Indeed, several Justices, in
separate opinions, expressly recognized the right of unnamed class
members to mount such a collateral challenge.19 5
C. Enjoining Suits for Damages
Current judicial doctrine holds that the settlement of a class suit
for injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) does
not preclude subsequent individual actions for damages. 19 6 In ordi-
nary litigation, claim preclusion applies to all claims that were or
could have been asserted. However, since unnamed class members
have little or no control over either the class representatives or class
counsel, their claims for damages, at least if they are substantial
enough to warrant individual suits, must be actually and fairly liti-
191. Id. at 370-71.
192. Id. at 372. The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), provides that
the "judicial proceedings" of a state "shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State ... from which they are taken."
193. Matshusita, 516 U.S. at 373-79.
194. Id. at 379 n.5.
195. Id. at 396 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); cf. id. at 387 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Professors Wright, and others, explain the logic of this aspect of class action pre-
clusion doctrine in their work. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 4455; see also
Wasserman, supra note 171, at 489 (stating that Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984), implicitly assumes that "individual claims [for
damages are] not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion even though they
[appear] to involve the same transaction or series of connected transactions").
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gated to be precluded. In a class suit seeking entirely equitable relief,
individual damage claims would not, of course, be tried. Nonetheless,
issues common to equitable relief and damage claims might be fully
and fairly tried if the class suit were actually litigated to judgment. In
this event, the ordinary principles of issue preclusion should apply.
Although a "settlement" judgment would not give rise to issue preclu-
sion in the technical sense, the parties to the class action sometimes
agree to particular resolutions of specified issues. Similarly, as part of
the settlement agreement, the parties sometimes specify the forfeiture
of certain claims, such as those for damages.
Thus, it is the settlement context that poses the greatest risk of an
improper forfeiture of damage claims. Here, again, analysis under a
modified representative model is illuminating. In Colt Industries
Shareholder Litigation,197 the New York Court of Appeals was faced
with the problem of whether it could enjoin damage actions in other
states that were based on the transaction at issue in the class suit.
The New York litigation, which sought primarily but not exclusively
equitable relief, had been terminated by a settlement.198 The Colt
court stated:
[T]he trial court did err as a matter of law by seeking to bind an absent plain-
tiff with no ties to New York state to a settlement that purported to extinguish
its rights to bring an action in damages in another jurisdiction. We reach this
conclusion based on our consideration of the terms of the settlement reflected
in the judgment, on our reading of Shutts, and on our belief that the Supreme
Court in that decision intended to afford substantial protections to out-of-
State plaintiffs in State class action suits.1 9 9
The court elaborated by noting that a claim for damages is a "distinct
right" that cannot be "exacted as a price" for equitable relief in a set-
tlement.200 This characterization follows from the Supreme Court's
description in Shutts that portrayed a damages action as a "property
right."201 Thus, the Colt court reasoned, before enjoining further
damages actions, the lower court should have afforded absent plain-
tiffs the opportunity to opt out of the settlement.202
Analysis under a representational model supports this result, but
invites a somewhat different line of reasoning. Attention should fall
on the representational authority of the named class members in two
respects. First, if individual damage claims are substantial, there is
no reason to conclude that either the certifying court or the absent
class members-including those within the court's territorial jurisdic-
tion-expected the class representative to be empowered to forfeit the
197. 566 N.E.2d 1160 (N.Y. 1991).
198. See id. at 1166-67.






individual damage claims in exchange for prospective, equitable relief
to the class. In other words, the presumptive representational author-
ity of the named plaintiffs was to prosecute the equitable and damage
claims of the class. Representational authority should not be ex-
tended to embrace the representative's right to bargain away damage
claims of sufficient magnitude to justify an individual suit. Although
it may seem artificial to draw a distinction between a representative's
authority to prosecute a damage claim and her ability to forfeit or
compromise it as part of a settlement agreement, the difference is jus-
tified in the class action context. The reason is that the unnamed
class members neither choose their representatives (including the
class attorneys) nor do they exercise any control over them. There is
the additional risk that individual damage claims may be substan-
tially under-valued in the settlement context. And, as noted earlier, it
is this context that poses the greatest risk of a schism between the
absent class and its representatives, including class counsel. In settle-
ment negotiations, adversarial postures become infused with the give
and take of accommodation, increasing the risk that unnamed class
members' claims for monetary relief will be forfeited by the class rep-
resentatives and class counsel.
It is important, moreover, to understand that the relationship
among absent class members, named class members, and class coun-
sel functions quite unlike a traditional agency or representative rela-
tionship. A traditional fiduciary ordinarily does not have a stake in an
outcome he affects by his representation of the principle. Further, a
traditional agency relationship is usually consensual, in contrast to
the judicially imposed relationship that positions the named class
members and class counsel as surrogates of the entire class.2 03 It
would be hazardous and generally unrealistic for courts to treat class
representatives as perfect agents or fiduciaries of the unnamed class
members. Courts should be especially cautious in certifying damage
claims for class treatment under (non-opt-out) mandatory classes, and
usually should not permit substantial damage claims to be compro-
mised without giving all unnamed class members the chance to ex-
clude themselves. The right to opt-out should extend to in-state as
well as out-of-state absentees because the presence or absence of per-
sonal jurisdiction is not the critical factor here. The controlling point
is the unique nature of the relationship between the class representa-
tive and the body of persons that he and the class attorneys represent.
Second, although a class representative may be empowered to act
with respect to declaratory and equitable claims common to the class,
it does not necessarily follow that she is empowered to represent class
members as to damage claims that are "common" to the class. A "hy-
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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brid" suit for damages arising out of the same transaction from which
a (b)(1) or (b)(2) equitable action arises may well involve different and
more individualized issues than the class action seeking only declara-
tory or injunctive relief. This is precisely why, as noted above, some
class actions are certified only on specified issues within the totality of
litigation.2O4 The fact that the class may be less cohesive as to the
damage claims (than as to the equitable claims) is further evidence
that, generally, named plaintiffs should not be permitted to represent
individual (unnamed) class members as to damage awards embraced
in a proposed settlement agreement of so-called mandatory class
actions.20 5
It is true, of course, that a class action would be more efficient if
the forum could settle all class claims and also control the often dis-
ruptive collateral activity of unnamed class members. While devices
such as injunctions and all-inclusive settlements may curb abusive be-
havior, they run counter to long-held principles limiting a forum
court's authority and have the potential of harsh and unfair re-
sults. 206 Despite those traditional limits, proposed amendments to
Rule 23 call for increased issue preclusion when a class court refuses
to certify a proposed class 20 7 or declines to approve a proposed settle-
ment. 2 08 Even more striking is a proposal that allows a class court to
enter an order forbidding members of a proposed class from pursuing
individual claims. 20 9 The historic tradition of the individual's right to
204. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
205. Courts are also informed by the principles controlling their own power over the
proceedings of another tribunal. For example, in Baker v. General Motors Corp.,
522 U.S. 222 (1998), a Michigan court issued a nationwide antitestimonial injunc-
tion over a plaintiff as part of the class settlement in that case. The plaintiffwas
then subpoenaed to testify in a different case against GM in Missouri. In a unan-
imous decision, the Supreme Court held it would not accord full faith and credit
to the injunction because the Michigan court could not "control proceedings
against GM brought in other States . . . asserting claims the merits of which
Michigan has not considered." Id. at 223. Thus, in addition to due process, con-
siderations of power are important when a court must decide whether to issue an
anti-suit injunction in the class context.
206. For example, under the doctrine of preclusion, a forum court cannot limit class
members from litigating issues in other jurisdictions it did not fairly decide.
Moreover, there is a long tradition of limiting the territorial jurisdiction of both
state and federal courts.
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(D) (Class Action Subcomm., Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules, Proposed Rule 2001). The proposals cited in the text below, infra nn.208-
10, are in "discussion" drafts. See Class Action Subcomm., Advisory Comm. on
Civil Rules, Report of the Class Action Subcommittee, Agenda item 5 for the April
10-11 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Mar. 28, 2000) (unpub-
lished report, available from the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules).
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5) (Class Action Subcomm., Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules,
Proposed Rule 2001); see supra note 207.
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1) (Class Action Subcomm., Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules,
Proposed Rule 2001); see supra note 207.
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control the prosecution and defense of his own lawsuit, the unique na-
ture of class action "representative" suits, and the limits placed upon a
sovereign's judicial power should operate collectively to restrain the
reach of the class action judge. Just as the nature of the representa-
tive actions dictates a departure from ordinary suits, so too, the na-
ture of class actions dictates a departure from ordinary representative
actions. Class representatives, who trace their authority to judicial
appointment and acquiescence (rather than appointment by those
they represent), should not have broad power to bind the class, but
rather should be confined to limited, carefully monitored
representation.
V. CONCLUSION
Class actions, like spring flowers (or autumn weeds) are bursting
out all over. Their proliferation in state and federal courts has
ushered in new challenges for the legal system. From the standpoints
of history, constitutional doctrine, and practicality, the representative
model of the class suit offers the most promising approach to resolving
the vexing problems of the modern class action. Despite the criticisms
leveled against the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the drafters founded
their work on the representative model, creating class action guide-
lines designed to take account of the differences between a class action
and a traditional representative lawsuit. While it is true that modern
class actions pose difficulties unforeseen by the rulemakers in 1966,
the modified representative model is the most useful analytic tool for
resolving current issues. Unfortunately, courts and commentators too
often lose sight of this model, thus deflecting attention and analysis
away from the proper underpinnings of modern class litigation.
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